

THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO RELIGION.

By Rudolf Eucken.

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THE relation of Philosophy to Religion has undergone many changes during the last few centuries. After English Deism had developed, in opposition to traditional Christianity its religion of the Reason, it was German Idealism more particularly which eagerly strove to bring about an understanding between the two movements. Leibnitz sought to avert the threatening disruption between Christianity and Modern Thought by a reconciling line of enquiry that found some place for everything. Kant went still deeper by bringing a quite distinctive method to bear upon the question. The ordinary psychological procedure which took particular individuals for its starting point was replaced by a noölogical (or transcendental) method according to which the underlying support of life and thought was assigned to forces that transcend the limits of the individual. The whole world of thought was thereby revolutionized: there arose the prospect of a closer union between religion and philosophy, and of discovering the deeper-lying psychic roots of religion itself. The development of these tendencies in detail followed many widely diverging lines. Kant treated moral freedom as the basic concept, relating it also firmly to religion. Schleiermacher declared feeling to be the chief source of the spiritual life, and he saw in religion a fundamental experience of the spirit leading to greater emotional fervour; he would also leave to each religion the completest freedom to follow its own distinctive genius. Hegel regarded religion as a stage of "Absolute Thought," and indispensable to man; moreover since he had a strong predilection for a self-contained system, the movement of Religion also appealed to him as an aspiration after an all-embracing unity. All these ramifying forms of philosophical thought have been influential in Germany right up to the present time. In the later half of the century it was the Neo-Kantian movement in particular that gave new life to Kant's ethical way of thinking, whilst in the domain of scientific theology, Ritschl's thought was for long the dominating influence. This Neo-Kantian school broke definitely

with Metaphysics: it sought in its own independent way to unite historical Christianity closely with the central position of the Kantian ethic.

The movement of the nineteenth century withdrew itself more and more from the problems of the inner life and of speculative philosophy also, and found the chief task of philosophy in the interpretation and thorough exploitation of the world of sense. Idealism gave place to Realism. But even realism, in so far as it did not proclaim an outspoken materialism, sought to find some place for religion. The immediate result was a positivism, anticipated by different French and English thinkers, but eventually shaped by Comte into a coherent system. The historical movement of religion appeared to him only a transitional stage leading from mythology to a strictly scientific way of thinking, and he found a substitute for the religions of the past in a religion of humanity. The welfare of man is here the main goal of endeavour; but associated with this is a firm belief in the greatness and in the progress of humanity. This line of thought presupposes a remarkably optimistic view of man's position in the universe. As a counterpart to Positivism we have Agnosticism (the name is Huxley's). Agnosticism does not find it necessary to deny unconditionally the possibility of unexplored depths of life, but it flatly denies that human beings can find their way thither; this Agnosticism has won many friends in the scientific world, men who may suspend their judgment concerning the great world-problems, but easily forget that in their turning away from all metaphysical questions, they are practically committing themselves to a denial of religion and of all spiritual depth.

The development of the Hegelian philosophy brought with it, in a remarkable way, an uncompromising rejection of religion. Hegel himself had recognised the transcendent power of the spiritual life and had thought most fruitfully about religion. But in so far as the left wing of his disciples, the so-called Young Hegelian party, transformed the spiritual life into a mere work of man, it abandoned the foundation on which religion rested. It was Ludwig Feuerbach in particular who saw in religion only man's own reflection of himself in the inaccessible whole of things, a mere broadcasting of human ideas and wishes, and thereby transformed Theology into Anthropology, into a portrayal of man's estate which possesses no truth at all outside its reference to man. This radical turn of thought won at first only a small circle of adherents, but the advent of Social Democracy and especially of Marxism lent a

great power to the movement, and in Russia of the present day it exercises a preponderating influence. That in Germany too, the view was broadly influential is explicable on many grounds. The German has a strong natural bent towards religion. How much this means to him may be seen from Meister Eckhart (+1329), the leader of German mysticism, from Luther, and from the religious philosophers of the Classical period. We see a whole-hearted endeavour here to fill the entire soul with religion, and probe its very roots. But even here we find much subjectivity and individualism, a preponderating intellectual tendency also, and with this but little inclination to take an active part in the social life: as a spiritual type the German is more reflective than volitional. Moreover under the guidance of the Reformation Germany got ahead of the other great peoples in popular enlightenment, and this without the balancing influence of political training, so that a certain one-sidedness was unmistakeable. Under ordinary circumstances, this development might have proceeded quietly, but when Modern Labour made factory work the main thing, and the rapid advance of German industry led the masses to organise themselves firmly and to become fully conscious of their power, it gave rise to serious complications. It encouraged the growth of a sharp opposition, not only to the traditional State but to the Church also, Religion appearing to many workers as a political institution favouring the rulers of the existing order. Even to-day the majority of the industrial workers in Germany show unfriendly feeling towards religion and Christianity. It is only quite recently that a leaning towards an unprejudiced estimate has been growing up among the younger socialists.

Whilst efforts in this direction often led to a flat denial of religion, energetic attempts were not lacking during the last century, nor indeed in our own day, to set up an understanding between religion and philosophy upon the basis of experience, and to give religion new motives and a new outlook. In this respect Pragmatism merits attention. Setting aside all metaphysics as superfluous and even harmful, it concentrated its whole interest on man, and made his well-being the main aim of all endeavour. The influence of ideas on human life was carefully sifted, even religion must needs conform to the standard of human welfare. This can easily pass over into a utilitarian way of thinking, but the movement has been stimulating in many ways, as even those who oppose Pragmatism on principle may very well recognise. In any case it was an indubitable gain that the Psychology of Religion should have won from this standpoint an independent status and power. Religious

Psychology in the individual features of its treatment is by no means new, Augustine, for instance, is an excellent religious psychologist, but it remained for Modern Times to gather the ideas together and to build up out of this an independent scientific discipline. The whole religious problem was thus lit up in a new way, and a fruitful development followed. A voluminous literature has resulted and it is incessantly on the increase. But though we set a high value on Religious Psychology with its penetrating analysis of the varieties of religious experience we would avoid confusing the Psychology with the Philosophy of Religion. Religious Philosophy is concerned with the fundamental truth of religion, Religious Psychology with the effect of religion on man and with his states of religious experience. These two ways of regarding religion may very well go forward together, and lend each other mutual support; but the leading role must remain with Religious Philosophy.

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Closely related to the pragmatic line of thought is a certain peculiar way of dealing with philosophic problems which has received much attention in Germany and gained many adherents, the Philosophy of the "As if," the foundations of which have been laid by Vaihinger, whose acute mind is furnished with rich resources of knowledge. His method rests on the concept of "fiction," which is clearly distinguished from that of hypothesis. Under "fiction" we are dealing with products of imagination which help and facilitate the presenting of ideas without themselves possessing any truth at all. The place of Truth is here taken by Utility and Purposiveness. The concept of the "fiction" has played a considerable part in enquiries concerning the nature of Right, and even beyond this sphere it can prove most suggestive, but it cannot possibly play the decisive part in establishing the foundations of the world of thought. Certainly it is just the religious sphere which, in its human aspect, reveals a marked disproportion between ideas and things, and often we must content ourselves with images and similitudes. But those images are not therefore in any way mere products of imagination; behind the images are spiritual movements and requirements, and these have given birth to further development which penetrate to the very heart of life, passing far beyond the sphere of utility. We willingly admit that in the convictions of those thinkers a practical idealism is often found united with the fictions, but the danger still remains that an Idealism of this kind lacks all sure foundation.

There is no doubt but that the relation of Philosophy to Religion to-day is a pitifully uncertain one, and various ways out have been followed, not only in Germany, but in the world at large, for the problem at present reaches beyond the special religions and affects the whole civilised world. In Germany more particularly, there are many who feel the traditional form of Christianity as too narrow and anthropomorphic. Artistic circles lean often towards a Pantheism which would explain Nature (or maybe explain it away) from the divine standpoint; but the concepts it employs are very vague. Since the life of India rose into view above the European horizon, there has been no lack of such as look wholly for salvation to an absorption in the unity and eternity of the divine nature, or else take refuge in Buddhism, but these movements have not aimed at extending their influence. The main tendency of German life also is in the direction of Christianity with its fundamental ethical convictions. The yearning for more power and depth of spiritual life increases ceaselessly, and is fed also by strong weariness of spirit in regard to the existing state of civilisation which offers little to the spiritual life; we are conscious of many complications here and of many misfits which we have not the strength to put right.

A yearning desire for inner renewal and power stirs all earnest souls to-day and impels us towards Religion; and since matters of principle are at stake the aid of Philosophy is indispensable. We cannot fail to see that difficult problems are here involved, nor shut our eyes to the fact that since the world of thought was established on a Christian foundation deep-reaching changes have taken place, and it is up to us to meet these changes with honest and open discussion. We must, nevertheless, hold fast with all our might to the eternal truths of our religious conviction, and we must sufficiently distinguish between the unfading realities of Religion and the limited forms these take under stress of the historical situation. It is our conviction that Philosophy cannot fulfil the task required of it, if it does not recognise and adopt a firm metaphysical foundation. We are in danger to-day of being too indulgent towards what is human and sensory, and thereby lapsing into pitiable shallowness. Philosophy has the task of uniting with the full freedom of its scientific labour the confident conviction that all human undertakings rest on superhuman support, and that only so can genuine truth-content be secured. To this extent Religion and Philosophy stand in need of each other. Inwardly to unite freedom and depth is an urgent task which Religion and Philosophy must fulfil together.

DAS VERHAELTNIS DER PHILOSOPHIE ZUR RELIGION.

Von Rudolf Eucken

Das Verhaeltnis der Philosophie zur Religion hat in den letzten Jahrhunderten manche Wandlungen durchgemacht. Nachdem der englischen Deismus dem ueberleiferten Christentum seine Vernunftreligion entgegengesetzt hatte, war es namentlich der deutsche Idealismus, welcher mit grossem Eifer fuer eine Verstaendigung beider Getrieb gewirkt hat. Leibniz suchte den drohenden Zwiespalt des Christentums und der modernen Denkweise durch ein ausgleichendes und umfassendes Forschen zu ueberwinden. Tiefer noch wirkte Kant, indem er ein eigentuemliches Verfahren aufbrachte: die uebliche psychologische Art, welche von den einzelnen Individuen ausging, wurde durch eine noologische (oder transcendente) ersetzt, welche zum Traeger des Lebens und Denkens ueberindividuelle Kraefte machte; das hat die ganze Gedankenwelt umgestaltet, es versprach auch Philosophie und Religion einander enger zu verbinden und die letzten seelischen Wurzeln der Religion aufzudecken. In der naecheren Ausfuehrung aber gingen die Wege weit auseinander. Kant behandelt die moralische Freiheit als den Grundbegriff, der auch zur Religion eine feste Beziehung hatte, Schleiermacher erklaerte das Gefuehl als die Hauptquelle des geistigen Lebens, und er sah in der Religion eine Grunderfahrung jenes Lebens, das liess eine groessere seelische Waerme gewinnen, zugleich eroeffnete es der Individualitaet der einzelnen Religionen freiesten Raum; Hegel verstand die Religion als eine dem Menschen unentbehrliche Stufe des "absoluten Denkens"; wie er namentlich darin stark war, ein geschlossenes System auszubilden, so galt ihm auch die Bewegung der Religion als ein Streben nach allumfassender Einheit. Alle diese Verzweigungen des philosophischen Denkens wirken in Deutschland bis in die Gegenwart hinein; in der zweiten Haelfte des Jahrhunderts hat namentlich der Neukantianismus die moralische Denkweise Kants neu belebt, fuer die wissenschaftliche Theologie gewann laengere Zeit Ritschl einen ueberragenden Einfluss. Dieser Neukantianismus verwarf die Metaphysik entschieden, er suchte in freier Weise eine enge Verbindung des geschichtlichen Christentums mit dem Kern der kantischen Moral.

Die Bewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts hat sich immer weiter von den Problemen des inneren Lebens und zugleich der spekulativen Philosophie entfernt und die Hauptaufgabe der Philosophie in der Klaerung und Durcharbeitung der sinnlichen Welt gefunden, der Idealismus wich dem Realismus. Aber auch der Realismus, sofern er nicht einem ausgesprochenen Materialismus huldigte, suchte irgendwelchen Platz fuer die Religion zu gewinnen. So geschah es zunaechst im Positivismus, der durch verschiedene englische und franzoesische Denker vorbereitet war, aber schliesslich in Comte ein durchgebildetes System fand. Ihm erschien die Religion in der geschichtlichen Bewegung nur als eine

Durchgangsstufe von der mythologischen zu einer streng wissenschaftlichen Denkweise. Aber er fand einen Ersatz fuer die bisherige Religion in einer Religion der Humanitaet, das Wohl der Menschheit bildet hier das Hauptziel des Strebens, es wirkt dabei eine feste Glaube an die Grosse und an den Fortschritt der Menschheit. Diese Denkweise fordert einen starken Optimismus gegenueber der menschlichen Lage.

Dem Positivismus entspricht der Agnostizismus (der Name stammt von Huxley), er braucht die Moeglichkeit weiterer Lebenstiefen nicht unbedingt zu leugnen, aber er verneint entschieden, dass wir Menschen einen Weg dahin finden; dieser Agnostizismus hat manche Freunde in der wissenschaftlichen Welt gewonnen, diese moechten gegenueber den Welt-problemen eine Zurueckhaltung bewahren, sie vergessen aber leicht, dass die Ablehnung aller metaphysischen Fragen praktisch auf eine Verneinung der Religion und aller geistigen Tiefe hinauslaeuft.

In merkwuerdiger Weise ist aus der Entwicklung der Hegel'schen Philosophie eine schroffe Verwerfung der Religion hervorgegangen. Hegel selbst hat dem Geistesleben eine ueberlegene Macht anerkannt und der Religion fruchtbarste Gedanken gewidmet. Aber indem der radikale Fluegel seiner Anhaenger, der sogenannte Junghegelianismus, das Geistesleben in ein blosses Werk des Menschen verwandelte, hat er die Grundlage der Religion aufgegeben. Es war namentlich Ludwig Feuerbach, der in jener nur eine menschliche Spiegelung des Menschen in das unzugaeenglich All, nur eine blossе Ausstrahlung menschlicher Vorstellungen und Wuensche sah, damit verwandelte sich ihm die Theologie in eine Anthropologie, in eine Schilderung menschlicher Lagen, die jenseit des Menschen keine Wahrheit besitzt.

Diese radikale Denkweise hat zunaechst nur kleinere Kreise gewonnen, aber das Auftreten der Sozialdemokratie, insbesondere des Marxismus, hat ihr eine grosse Macht verliehen, sie uebt in gegenwaertigen Russland eine ueberwiegende Macht. Dass sie auch in Deutschland weite Kreise gewann, erklaert sich aus verschiedenen Gruenden. Der Deutsche hat von Haus aus einen starken Zug zur Religion; wie viel sie ihm bedeutet, das zeigen Meister Eckhart (gestorben 1329), das Haupt der deutschen Mystik, Luther, die Religionsphilosophen der klassischen Zeit. Es ist hier ein eifriges Streben, die Religion in ihre tiefsten Wurzeln zu verfolgen und die ganze Seele mit ihr zu erfuellen. Aber es findet sich auch viel Subjektivitaet und Individualismus, auch ein Ueberwiegen des Intellektualismus, zugleich wenig Neigung sich an dem gesellschaftlichen Leben aktiv zu beteiligen, der Deutsche ist in seiner geistigen Art mehr Gedankenmensch als Willensmensch. Dazu kam, dass unter der Fuehrung der Reformation in der Volksbildung Deutschland den anderen grossen Voelkern voranging, ohne dass eine politische Taetigkeit ein Gegengewicht lieferte, eine Einseitigkeit war nicht zu verkennen. Diese Entwicklung konnte im gewoehnlichen Lauf der Dinge ruhig verlaufen, sie erzeugte aber die bedenklichsten Verwicklungen, als die moderne Arbeit den

Fabrikbetrieb zur Hauptsache machte, und der rasche Aufstieg der deutschen Industrie die Massen zu einer festen Organisation und zum vollen Bewusstsein ihrer Macht fuehrte. Das konnte leicht in einen schroffen Gegensatz sowohl gegen den bisherigen Staat als gegen die Kirche geraten, die Religion erschien manchen Arbeitern als eine politische Einrichtung zu Gunsten der bisherigen Machthaber. So hat auch heute die Mehrzahl der deutschen Fabrikarbeiter unfreundliche Gefuehle gegen die Religion und gegen das Christentum, erst neuerdings scheint sich in der sozialistischen Jugend eine Wendung zu einer unbefangenen Wuerdigung anzubahnen.

Wahrend in dieser Richtung die Bestrebungen oft einer schroffen Verneinung der Religion verfielen, hat es im Verlauf des 19. Jahrhunderts und in der Gegenwart nicht an eifrigen Bemuehungen gefehlt, auf dem Boden der Erfahrung eine Verstaendigung zwischen Religion und Philosophie herzustellen und zugleich der Religion neue Antriebe und Aussichten zu eroeffnen. In dieser Hinsicht verdient der Pragmatismus unsere Aufmerksamkeit. Indem er alle Metaphysik als ueberfluessig, ja schaedlich ablehnt, werdet er sich ganz und gar zum Menschen und macht er sein Wohl zum Hauptziel alles Strebens. Hier wird die Wirkung der Gedanken auf den Menschen sorgfaeltig erwogen, auch die Religion muss sich den Massstab des menschlichen Wohls gefallen lassen, es kann das die Wendung zu einer utilitarischen Denkweise nehmen aber es hat manche Anregungen gebracht, die auch der prinzipielle Gegner des Pragmatismus anerkennen mag. Jedenfalls war es ein unbestreitbarer Gewinn, dass von hier aus die Religionspsychologie zu einer selbstaendigen Macht gelangt ist. Die Religionspsychologie ist in den einzelnen Punkten keineswegs neu, es war z. B. Augustin ein ausgezeichneter Psycholog der Religion, aber der Neuzeit blieb es vorbehalten, die Gedanken zusammenzufassen und eine selbstaendige wissenschaftliche Diziplin daraus zu bilden. Das ganze religioese Problem erfuhr dadurch eine neue Beleuchtung und eine fruchtbare Weiterbildung, es ist eine zahlreiche Literatur daraus entstanden, die unablaessig anschwillt. Aber so hoch wir die Religionspsychologie mit ihrer eingehenden Wuerdigung der mannigfaltigen religioesen Erlebnisse schaeetzen, Religionsphilosophie und Religionspsychologie duerfen nicht vermengt werden, die Religionsphilosophie hat mit der Grundwahrheit der Religion zu tun, die Religionspsychologie aber mit der Wirkung auf den Menschen und mit seinen Zustaenden; beide Betrachtungsweisen koennen sehr wohl zusammen gehen und sich gegenseitig foerdern, aber die Fuehrung muss der Religionsphilosophie verbleiben.

Den Gedankengaengen des Pragmatismus ist nahe verwandt eine eigentuemliche Behandlungen der philosophischen Probleme, welche in Deutschland viel Aufsehen erregt und manche Freunde gewonnen hat: das ist die Philosophie des "als ob," welche von Vaihinger scharfsinnig und mit Verwendung eines reichen Wissens begruendet ist. Sein Ver-

fahren begründet sich auf den Begriff der Fiktion, welcher deutlich von dem der Hypothese unterschieden wird. Bei der Fiktion handelt es sich um Einbildungen, welche der menschlichen Vorstellung zur Hilfe und Erleichterung dienen, ohne selbst eine Wahrheit zu besitzen, es tritt hier an die Stelle der Wahrheit die Nützlichkeit und Zweckmässigkeit. Dieser Begriff der Fiktion hat im Rechtswesen eine nicht geringe Rolle gespielt, er kann auch darüber hinaus mannigfaltige Anregung bringen, aber er kann unmöglich die entscheidende Grundlage der Gedankenwelt bedeuten. Allerdings zeigt gerade das religiöse Gebiet eine grosse Unangemessenheit des menschlichen Vorstellens gegenüber den menschlichen Dingen, wir müssen uns oft mit Bildern und Gleichnissen begnügen. Aber jene Bilder sind deshalb noch keineswegs bloss Einbildungen, hinter den Bildern stehen geistige Bewegungen und Forderungen, diese haben eingreifende Weiterbildungen des Lebens erzeugt, sie überschreiten weit das Gebiet der Nützlichkeit. Wir anerkennen gern, dass in den Ueberzeugungen jener Denker sich oft mit den Fiktionen ein praktischer Idealismus verbindet, aber es bleibt stets die Gefahr, dass ein solcher Idealismus einer sicheren Grundlage entbehrt.

Das unterliegt keinem Zweifel, dass heute das Verhältniss von Philosophie und Religion eine bedauerliche Unsicherheit hat, und dass recht verschiedene Wege zur Abhilfe eingeschlagen werden, nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern in der weiten Welt, denn das Problem geht heute über die besonderen Religionen hinaus durch die ganze Kulturwelt. In Deutschland namentlich empfinden viele die überkommene Form des Christentums als zu eng und anthropomorph. Krenkreise neigen oft zu einem Pantheismus, der die Natur von der Gottheit aus erklären möchte, aber er pflegt sehr vage Begriffe zu verwenden. Seit dem Eintreten des indischen Lebens in den europäischen Gesichtskreis fehlt es nicht an solchen, welche auf dem Wege der Versenkung in die göttliche Einheit und Ewigkeit alles Heil erwarten oder auch sich zum Buddhismus flüchten, aber eine grössere Wirkung haben diese Bestrebungen nicht erzielt. Der Grundzug auch des deutschen Lebens geht nach der Richtung des Christentums mit seiner ethischen Grundüberzeugung. Es wächst unablässig die Sehnsucht nach mehr Kraft und Tiefe des geistigen Lebens, es wirkt dahin auch eine starke Ermüdung an der jetzt herrschenden Kultur, die dem geistigen Leben wenig bietet; wir empfinden hier manche Verwicklungen und Missstände, denen wir nicht gewachsen sind. So geht ein sehnliches Verlangen nach einer inneren Erneuerung und Kräftigung durch alle ernsten Gemüther; das treibt auf den Weg der Religion, und da es sich um prinzipielle Fragen handelt, so ist die Hilfe der Philosophie nicht zu entbehren; schwere Probleme sind hier nicht zu verkennen. Wir können uns nicht verhehlen, dass seit der christlichen Festlegung der Gedankenwelt eingreifende Umwandlungen vor sich gegangen sind, es gilt uns mit diesen Umwandlungen offen und ehrlich auseinanderzusetzen, andererseits aber müssen wir die ewigen Wahrheiten

unserer religioesen Ueberzeugung mit aller Energie festhalten, wir muessen zwischen dem bleibenden Grundbestande der Religion und ihrer Bedingtheit durch die weltgeschichtliche Lage genuegend unterscheiden. Die Philosophie aber kann nach unserer Ueberzeugung die Aufgabe nicht erfuellen, ohne eine feste metaphysische Grundlage anzuerkennen und zu vertreten; wir sind heute in der Gefahr, dem Menschlichen und Sinnlichen zu sehr nachzugeben und dadurch einer traurigen Verflachung zu verfallen. Die Philosophie hat die Aufgabe, mit der vollen Freiheit der wissenschaftlichen Forschung das zuversichtliche Bewusstsein zu verbinden, dass alles menschliche Unternehmen von der uebermenschlichen Macht getragen wird, und dass es nur dadurch einen rechten Wahrheitsgehalt erlangt; insofern sind Religion und Philosophie aufeinander angewiesen Freiheit und Tiefe innerlich zu verbinden, das ist eine dringende Aufgabe, welche Religion und Philosophie gemeinsam ist.

NOTES BY THE WAY.

No. 1.

The Uses of Leisure.

We all desire energy of life—the quick beat of the pulse and the eager sweep of the spirit, but what dusty answers most of us get to our desires. The poet wrote,—Getting and spending we lay waste our powers. It is not so much in getting and spending, as in the intervals of leisure which lie between the spaces of our work, that we are guilty of waste. Leisure can be a noble thing: it can be the growing time of the mind, which, released from the coil and routine of work, can straighten itself and expand in its hours of freedom. But how few can spend their leisure nobly; how few have had that training in the love of truth and the passion for its search—in the taste for beauty and the longing for things beautiful—which alone can give men the harvest of a quiet eye. A community has to be trained not only to do its work, but also to enjoy its leisure; and there is a sense in which leisure, in the fine Aristotelian sense of the word, is more important than work. One might almost say that the greatest aim of any training of the mind is to ensure, or at any rate to promote the right enjoyment of leisure.

—Ernest Barker, in the *Hibbert Journal*.

A NEW STUDY OF CHRISTIANITY AND CHRISTIAN ORIGINS (V. MACCHIORO).

I.—GOSPEL AND CHURCH.

By the Editor.

IN history as in science, to state a problem fully would be to solve it. The difficulty is to state the problem in its entirety, to set forth all the factors which make up the fact to be explained. The difficulty becomes a practical impossibility when we come to deal with great spiritual productions or creations, whether individual or collective. After the most painstaking investigation of causes and conditions, antecedents and environment, an elusive X remains to baffle us. Failing to explain, we take refuge in phrases. We invoke the *Zeitgeist*, the creative force of genius, the power of personality. We drag in miracle and the supernatural. Mussolini, addressing the Fascisti just before their victorious march to Rome, reminded them that "in Rome took place the greatest miracle known to history, the transformation of an oriental religion, *which we did not understand*, into a universal religion, which, under another form, has taken over the Empire carried by the consular legions into the ends of the earth." But what may be pardonable in the political or ecclesiastical rhetorician, is not permissible to the historian or the philosopher, who seek *rerum cognoscere causas*. They cannot, in dealing with "things we do not understand" appeal to miracle and the supernatural. To do so is to degrade science to the level of Apologetics.

The problem of the rise of Christianity may never be thoroughly solved. But the difficulty of the solution is increased by the way in which separate problems have been confused in one general problem. Historical and psychological questions of fact seem unimportant before the metaphysical question, which soon acquires the overpowering significance of a great cosmic drama. Even within the historical field, the problem of the rise and progress of Christianity is really a double problem. The problem of the growth and progress of organised and institutional Christianity, is not the same as the earlier problem of the transformation of the ethical idealism of Jesus into the mysticism and sacramentalism of primitive Christianity. The two problems, if not entirely separate are at least separable. Sir Henry Wotton found religion in Rome converted "from a rule of conscience into an instrument of state, and from the mistress of all sciences into a very handmaid of ambition." The position of Pope Pius IX. was not in essentials different from that of the great Pope Hildebrand. Writers like Chesterton and Belloc do their best to "lend an idealism to reaction," but the Roman

system of ecclesiastical imperialism and theological absolutism is irreconcilable with the new social mind and the demands of the new society. "If anyone says that the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself and come to terms with progress, with liberalism and with modern civilisation, let him be anathema." (Papal Sylabus, 1864.)

It is not an easy task to treat religion and religious history from the standpoint of a scientific and impartial critical analysis. Passions and antagonisms come into play. A blind eye is turned on awkward facts and inconvenient texts. Evidence which would be dismissed without hesitation in other connections, is admitted without scruple, when the question is how to retain what is valuable for edification or hallowed by tradition. Even the most sympathetic of scientific critics is always liable to the charge, that he has, as an Anglican ecclesiastical historian puts it, "either overleapt or trampled underfoot those ancient boundaries by which the supernatural elements of Christianity were fenced from the intrusions of irreverent criticisms." The Roman Catholic Church, while in theory dependent on tradition, has in practice an effective answer to traditionalists. For an infallible Pope can *make* tradition. "La tradizione sono io," said Pope Pio Nono. The "Fundamentalists" of reactionary Protestantism are not in this happy position. They are chained to a traditional scheme of doctrine which is mediaeval in form and substance, and omits what was truly fundamental in the religion of Jesus, in whose teaching it would be difficult, if not impossible to find a single theological proposition.*

The cry, Back to Jesus! was raised before, and with increasing insistence, during and after the Great War. The immense outpouring of religious and quasi-religious literature may be regarded as a response to the cry, articulate and inarticulate, which has arisen from the hearts of countless men and women in our troubled times. The response has taken many forms. Some of these forms furnish rich material for the student of religious pathology. Others, like George Moore's *Brook Kerith*, and Papini's *Storia di Christo*, may be regarded as samples of the literary *tour de force*. The *Brook Kerith* has a certain merit as a work of art, in spite of the fantastic figure which Moore's imagination has fashioned to misrepresent the great Apostle of the Gentiles. The *Storia di Christo* is written by one, who, as he tells us, had from childhood, a "repulsion for all faiths, churches, and forms of a spiritual bondage," but who finally like Newman, although not after a similar spiritual history, was

*See Morgan *Religion and Theology of Paul*, p. 263. "Against the genuineness of the one distinctively theological saying, that of Matth. XI. 27ff. objections can be urged that to me at least seem decisive."

prepared to accept everything, down to the latest miracle of the latest saint. The "poetry of the Gospel, divine idyll and divine tragedy" as he finely terms it, disappears under a treatment which combines the crudely, sometimes coarsely realistic, with the sickly sentimental. For "reasons of art," he alters the order of time and events, omits, rearranges and expands, where "*materia dogmatica*" is not affected thereby. "Every epoch," he tells us, "must rewrite its Gospel," but the Gospel Papini writes is a reconstruction in up-to-date journalese, of the sacerdotal Christ of the Middle Ages. To the question, Where is the Risen Christ? he answers—"Christ is in the Gospels, in the apostolic tradition, and in the Church. *Outside of these are darkness and silence.*" We are taken back to the lurid apocalyptic visions of the primitive Christian imagination. (And yet "every epoch must write its own Gospel"). "The reign of Satan has now arrived at full maturity." "The world has only one religion, the worship of the Trinity of Wotan, Mammon, and Priapus." But from the "chaotic and slimy ocean of humanity" there emerges the Church, "the Church founded on the rock of Peter, the only church that deserves the name, the single and universal church, which speaks from Rome in the infallible words of the Vicar of Christ." The book is a bad mixture of piety and propaganda. Papini's attitude to any intelligent study of the Gospels is as ingenuously obscurantist as that of the most uncritical Protestant sectarian. "To try to distinguish in the Gospels, the certain from the probable, the historical from the legendary, the primitive from the dogmatic, is a hopeless enterprise." "He who accepts the four Gospels must accept them in their entirety (*tutti interi*) syllable by syllable—or reject them from first to the last, and say—we know nothing."

Very different is the work of Vittorio Macchiore, Professor in the Royal University of Naples, one of the latest and greatest of New Testament scholars. A summarised version of part of his more important work is, we understand, announced for publication in Germany, but his name is still practically unknown to English readers. Macchiore unites a breadth and depth of learning and an accurate scholarship to the skill of the trained expositor. His Italian style is a model of clearness and vigour. When he ventures on polemic, his dialectic is admirable, equally effective in defence and attack. But he is free from the pugnacity which unfortunately distinguishes so many biblical critics, who are "terrible fellows for fechtin.'"

Macchiore has been a contributor for many years to Italian Reviews and Academies, on subjects connected with religious arch-

aeology, but his more important works* are of recent date (1920-23), and are with two exceptions, devoted to studies of Orphism, and its relation as a Mystery Religion to Christianity. These very original and systematic studies show that Macchioro, besides being a master of scientific method, is possessed of rare powers of philosophical analysis and sympathetic insight. His great work on Orphism and Paulinism, including his treatises on Zagreus and Heraclitus, will be made the subject of another article in a later number of this Journal.

In *L'Evangelio* (one of the two exceptions referred to above) Macchioro sets himself a twofold task, to answer the question—how are we to realise to ourselves the essence of Christian faith, or, in simpler words, how should we read the Gospels;—and, what actual value can this faith have for the modern mind.** In reading the Gospels we must always bear in mind that the traditions therein contained were of Judaic-Hellenistic origin, that is, the product of a mentality which identified the mythical with the actual, religion with history. Myth must not, however, be confused with legend. Legend is erroneous and false, whereas myth is the expression of those religious intuitions which in their very nature defy “rational” formulation. The more we try to find the historical Jesus in the Gospels the less likely we are to find him. The Gospels announce the Christ who is risen, the Messiah whose mission was comprehended by the world only after he had been crucified. Not the national Messiah of history, but the universal Messiah of the spirit, for as the historical Jesus was dead, so was dead also the Judaic Messiah. The Fourth Gospel is neither more nor less historical than the three Synoptics. The point of view is different, but the process by which Jesus appears in the Fourth Gospel as the Logos incarnate is identical with that through which he appears in Matthew as the revealed Messiah. He who can believe in the Son of God can very well believe in the Logos. The difference is not in the historical content but in the way in which the person of Jesus is represented. The representations are different because the religious experience is different. Theological formulation was simply the attempt to give rational expression to the confused intuition that God in Jesus had descended upon earth. This appears first in the Gospel according to Matthew, as the belief that God had sent his Messenger to

**L'Evangelio*, Florence, 1922; *Teoria Generale della Religione come Esperienza*, Rome, 1922; *Zagreus, Studi sull'Orfismo*, Bari, 1920; *Heraclito, Nuovo Studi sull'Orfismo*, Bari, 1920; *Orfismo e Paulinismo, Studi e Polemiche*, Montevarchi, 1922.

**From this on to the end of the article, the writer has refrained from mingling criticism with exposition. He has tried by translating, condensing, and paraphrasing, to present Macchioro's thought, adding as little as possible of his own.

earth. In the second stage of Christian belief this representation is no longer felt as adequate, and God himself is thought to have descended upon earth, incarnate in Jesus. The historical fact thus becomes spiritual fact. The Passion which is a tragedy for the Jesus of the Synoptics, becomes a glorification for the Christ of the Fourth Gospel. The four gospels were made "canonical" in preference to gospels attributed to Peter and other apostles, not because of their superior authorship, but because they responded to the twofold need of the Christian faith which sees in Christ, Man and God, the historical and the spiritual Messiah. If we read the Gospels seeking there a man, we shall only find a dim figure, half mythical, half actual, something between the human and the divine. Behind the man that eludes us, rises the hero; behind the vanishing hero appears deity. But this nebulous vision is not the end. Little by little, with increasing familiarity with the Gospels, and with our own growth in spiritual experience, it becomes no longer a case of the myth being confused with truth, but of truth being revealed in the myth. We converse with Christ as with a living person, and we feel that he cannot be man, just because we do hold such converse with him. Then we understand why the Gospel contains the glad tidings. For they have regard not to an event of the dead past, but to an event which takes place every time we will it. It becomes the fundamental harmony of our souls, the theme on which is grounded the innumerable variations of our spirit, the synthesis of our life.

The second section of *L'Evangelio* contains an eloquent contrast between Paganism and Christianity, which perhaps could only have been written by a proud inheritor of Latin civilisation. Paganism, the essence of which was Pessimism, and Christianity, the essence of which is Optimism, represent not two antagonistic and mutually destructive religions, but two antithetic movements (or "moments") of the human spirit. Paganism never dies, because it belongs to our very nature. We are pagans because we are of Adam's flesh, born with the sin of finitude inherent in our spirits. Christianity has vanquished the paganism of history by political, theological, and philosophical weapons, but it never will vanquish it completely in spirit, because it cannot extirpate our finitude, and change man into God. The old pagan man who sleeps in the depths of our spirits will continually revive, and find in Greece and Rome the justification of himself and of his right to live. To pass from Paganism to Christianity does not mean that we should eliminate from our culture all that is classical. Rather does it mean to illumine with the light of Christianity all that is classical and pagan in our spirits. Religion and culture should not be regarded as opposite or parallel pursuits in a divided life. We must rather seek to

be inspired by a single idea, large enough to give unity and compactness to our disordered spirit, learn in fine, to live universally, that is, to live in God, in God who is Spirit, ever living in us and for us. This may cost us dearly, but only through the strait gate does one enter eternal life, and one must be faithful unto death, in order to have the crown of life which the Lord hath promised.

In the third section, entitled "Back to Jesus," Macchioro finds the Pagan-Christian antithesis recurring in the opposition between the Catholic spirit and the Protestant spirit; not because he identifies Catholicism with Paganism or Protestantism with Christianity, but because the struggle between Romanism and the Reformers arose from the same spiritual necessities which produced the pagan-Christian conflicts. Catholicism is not to be regarded as a religion merely. It represents that attitude or "moment" of the spirit in which everything appears clear, definite, certain, and the mind rests content in what seems its natural form and safe habitation. This "form," historically, is not a spontaneous creation of Catholicism itself, but a derived and adapted product, marvellously put together from many sources. Strictly speaking, there is no Catholic Philosophy, although there may be an official church philosophy. Every other great religion has its philosophy, the expression or epitome of its own specific religious experience and scheme of values. But Catholicism has only the Scholastic Philosophy, that is, an Aristotelian philosophy, which, in last analysis issued from a religion, Paganism, of which Catholicism ought to be the antithesis. Here Macchioro notes in passing a "curious fact." While on one side Christianity really destroys or inverts previous values to the extent that from it there has issued modern philosophy, Catholicism, which yet historically is within Christianity, refuses to accept the new values, and holds fast to the Scholasticism which modern philosophy has superseded. The result is a strange paradox—that while a Christian Philosophy may be said to exist, there is strictly speaking no Catholic philosophy, while the official church philosophy has a different origin from Christian philosophy. The lack of a specific philosophy denotes the absence of any inner drama or travail of the soul within Catholicism. Philosophy is the outcome of a restlessness of spirit which seeks and cannot find. Catholicism has little or none of this torment of the soul. It has found once for all the truth supreme. It claims to possess already what others are in search of. It has reached its goal. It is in port after the voyage. Hence the function of Catholicism is to systematise and conserve its own values. It has an instinctive repugnance to innovation and reformers. Therefore, what is important above all is "form," that is, the means wherewith to systematise and

maintain itself. Hence its natural tendency is towards art; and since action is necessary, it tends to become political. It turns naturally towards all that is external, practical, tangible, be it a picture or a system or a party. Aspirations, longings, and efforts of the soul, which cannot be translated in things sensible or tangible, are contrary to its spirit. Catholicism is essentially practical, economic. It is a scheme, a business, a polity and policy. It plays for safety. It is constructive rather than creative. It demands assent rather than activity. It thus as a matter of course sets itself in opposition to the movement which goes, somewhat unhappily, under the name of Protestantism.

The Reformation was a special case of a spiritual attitude, inseparable from man's inner life, to be found in all the higher religions, each of which had its movement of reform. The religious consciousness, feeling the inadequacy in and for its own experience of traditional schemes embodied in ecclesiastical institutions, breaks through their bonds, and seeks in other ways to satisfy its own particular needs. The Reformation set up, as a matter of fact, dogma against dogma, scheme against scheme, but in spirit and essence it represented something greater and finer than the Reformers themselves were aware of. The Reformation, in one aspect, was a concrete fact of history, unique, and, like all historical facts never to recur again, as such. This is the empirical view, dear to that Protestantism which is crudely anti-Catholic, and which lives its spiritual life for the most part in a dead past. In another aspect it is a spiritual fact which is continually repeating itself, marking successive stages in spiritual progress. The history of the human spirit is not a uniform and monotonous advance, as in the ordered sequence of organic growth, but a series of arrests and advances, an alternation of conservative and revolutionary movements. The "moment" of advance in which the spirit leaves the dogmatic abode which it had itself accepted or created, is localised in a definite historical movement (Revolution-Reformation). All thinking or believing humanity passes sooner or later, through this "moment." However varied it may appear, it is always fundamentally the same, the revolt of the individual against history, of the spirit against the letter, of experience against what claims to be knowledge, of intuition against reason. Catholicism and Protestantism, considered from this point of view, appear as two antithetical positions of the Christian consciousness which cannot be reconciled. It might be possible to reconcile in some fashion the dogmas and liturgies of the two, to bring about an external union, but it is impossible to reconcile the opposing conceptions of life and the world represented by them, for beneath every practical attempt at union, there is a deep-

rooted theoretical disharmony. Catholicism and Protestantism are two poles between which the spirit oscillates perpetually. There is no fact or problem which cannot be seen or judged in a Catholic or Protestant fashion, externally or internally, aesthetically or spiritually. If Philosophy is the glory of Protestantism, Art is the glory of Catholicism. The Reformation was a passing phase or embodiment of a great movement, a temporary disturbance of equilibrium. Luther was a mediaevalist or a modernist according to the point of view. The mind of the Reformers dogmatically was made up in the same fashion as the Catholic mind of the time. The great novelty was in the spirit, in the life which was made to circulate within the old schemes and formulas, in the right of the spiritual content to fashion or refashion its own form, or in other words, the refusal of the spirit to be the slave of its own past history.

Historic Protestantism is the victim of its own inner incoherence. It imposes dogmas and at the same time it claims the right to interpret them. The day on which Protestantism regards its "form" as fixed and final, its end and function will cease to be, for just in the transition between authority and liberty, past and future, it has its true life and being. The historic function of Protestantism consists not in asserting dogmas but in transcending them, even against its own desire and will to halt. Protestantism can never cry Halt! When the dogmatic schemes, framed and firmly fixed by orthodox tradition, cease to express religious experience, when fact and symbol no longer harmonise, then new symbols must be found, even if (since no symbols are adequate to the truth) the day should come when the new will have become old, and in its turn require to be transcended or superseded.

What is called heterodoxy is thus a direct consequence of orthodoxy. But for the law there were no sin. Reformations can take place only in religions which have a dogmatic structure, which claim to be in possession of a revelation which is referred to a Founder, maintained by a Church and imposed as a Faith. None of the great naturalistic religions show any trace of that which constitutes the immanent tragedy of Christianity—the perennial conflict between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. The tragedy is not absent from Roman Catholicism, although generally concealed under the outward appearance of harmony and submission. In the Catholic consciousness there is always someone or something submitting or rebelling. The colossal collective unity and coherence of the Catholic Church shows itself on analysis to be composed of an infinite number of individual incoherences. Under its outward appearance of dogmatic immobility it is pervaded by a perpetual pulsation of heresies. So was it in its earliest history; so is it

in its latest. Indeed it may be argued that Catholicism continues to live largely through the heretical lymph which circulates in its veins. Its unity, however, is bought at a price, at the cost of much tragic self-mutilation and sacrifice. The individual suffers that the whole may be saved.

In the long struggle between the principles of authority and liberty, authority was dominant during the Middle Ages, whereas in modern times liberty prevails over authority, except in certain cases, capable of special explanation. Authority now even seeks the support of liberty, allying itself with its former enemy. Will not this course of compromise or surrender prove in the long run fatal to the Church? It might be argued that Church and Religion must progress or decay together, since they are as closely connected as organ and function. Yet this academic thesis does not seem to be verified by the facts of history, and in our own day while ecclesiastical activities are severely restricted, the field of religious activity is being more and more extended. Should this process be continued it would end in the paradoxical situation, that Religion would be almost everything and the Church almost nothing. The function would increase as the organ diminished. The modern spirit wants to breathe more freely, but objects to lungs. There is evidently something wrong with the argument, and if we believe in the rationality of history we must find some explanation for this outward and apparently irrational antinomy. It is historically true that religious reform begins by setting itself against the Church. In order to change the function, it attempts to destroy the organ. Between ecclesiastical institutions and spiritual growth, there is the same antithesis as between the static and the dynamic, tradition and revolution, past and future. The office of the Church is to conserve and transmit values, not to create them. It is this practical function, recognised in all religions, which brings the Church into conflict with itself. All the greatest saints were in implicit or explicit opposition to the Church, which first brought them into subjection and afterwards loved and honoured them. Behind ecclesiastical history there is another history, the history of religion. The two have different needs and make different demands, and in the perpetual alteration of these demands we have another form of the eternal struggle between the Catholic spirit and the Protestant spirit. Catholicism is spontaneously ecclesiastical; the Roman Church which is tradition, authority, equilibrium, peace, is its natural organ. Protestantism is in essence anti-ecclesiastical, because it is the assertion of liberty and personality. Macchiore refuses to admit that the outcome of the conflict will be the disappearance of Catholicism and its replacement by Protestantism. If

Catholicism and Protestantism represent two necessary "moments" of the spirit, it is vain to expect the definite and final victory of one over the other. Some Protestant churches, especially those which seem to themselves to be decidedly anti-Catholic, are cramped within a hard immobile shell of doctrine and usage, while there is much in modern Catholicism notwithstanding its denunciation of historical Protestantism, which reveals a vigorous vitality and spiritual activity. We must not confuse the issues, or make the external the measure of the internal. The ecclesiastical question sinks into secondary importance before the spiritual question. Heresy may pass, but heresy remains as a necessity arising out of religious experience itself. Dogmas are accepted only because it is possible to live them as our own inner experience. If for particular psychological reasons religious experience ceases to find sustenance in the traditional forms, then heresy arises, first of all as negation of the traditional, and next as the beginning of a new tradition. Men no longer talk, except within certain narrow circles, of heresies and heretics, but although socially and morally, the words have lost their old significance, the ideas remain, for the spiritual problems which gave rise to the heresies of the early centuries are still alive. Dead is the Docetism which explained the corporeal nature of Christ as a mere appearance, but theosophists explain certain incidents by reference to Christ's "astral body." Arianism is dead, but to millions of Christians Jesus is a kind of intermediate being, not well definable, between human and divine. The Monophysites are gone, but to millions of Christians Jesus is God pure and simple. The old Christologies are dead and cannot be restored to life, but Christology remains in the Idealistic Christology of Hegel and his followers, the Romantic Christology of Schleiermacher, the Agnostic Christology of Ritschl. And other Christologies will follow as answers to the perennial problem—Who was He? What was He? The modern mind cannot answer, but it continues to adore. It is more aware of its own weakness, and consequently less arrogant both in its assertions and denials. It refuses to turn the mystery into a cut and dried formula, or to impose it as absolute truth on minds which cannot accept it. The relativity which dominates science has penetrated even within the closed camp of theology. It seems as if Christianity, freeing itself from the shackles of theologies and churches, were getting back to Jesus as the living centre of its faith, as in the time when there was neither Peter nor Paul, but Christ was all in all.

The case for heresy having thus been re-stated, Macchioro faces the final question of the necessity of a church at all, for if historic Christianity is to pass away before universalistic Christian-

ity, then the Church as an institution is an enemy to be destroyed, and not a friend, a refuge, and a strong defence. He puts the question in another form—Does there or can there exist in any real sense, an *individualistic* Christianity? If Christianity be reducible to a mode of thinking, a way of conceiving the universe, or to a practical moral life, it might be granted not only that Christianity does exist as such, but that every one can and ought to be Christian in his own way, and not as a mere subject or slave of others. "Would God that all the Lord's people were prophets!" But if Christianity signifies salvation in Christ, meaning thereby communion of man with God through Christ, then individualistic Christianity is a meaningless phrase to which nothing real corresponds. Communion of man with God through Christ means a spiritual rebirth in Christ, a relation of man to Christ which is real and concrete. But nearly twenty centuries intervene between the individual and Jesus. The Church is the guardian of tradition, and it is through tradition that the ravages of dividing time are overcome. The only kind of Christianity which can do without a Church is that non-religious Christianity, philosophical or ethical, which identifies the teaching of Jesus with a system or code having a value independent of his person. But this is not true Christianity. True Christianity is faith *in* Christ. For such Christianity a Church is necessary, since only in and through the Church is the temporal gulf bridged which separates the believer from his Lord and Master. Catholicism sets itself up as mediator between the believer and Christ whose spirit it claims to hold and to transmit. Protestantism on the contrary asserts that the true medium is the Gospels, accessible to all and containing the spirit of Christ, through which it is given to all men to know him. But if the Protestant believer fancies that he is thus freed from tradition he is suffering from a delusion, for the text itself as he reads it is the product of a tradition, and tradition enfolds and guides him in his interpretation. And the same holds true of creeds and commentators, and lives of Jesus, orthodox or heterodox, to which he may turn for enlightenment. It is vain for the believer to attempt to escape from tradition or traditionalism. Tradition enfolds and guides him at every step. Hence the need of a Church. Religions cannot exist without a Church, that is, a society of men united by a common faith, under those who are looked upon as its guardians and guides. The spiritual rebirth of a society must begin in and from a Church if it is to be a social and historical fact, and not a mere episode of the individual consciousness. A "universalistic" Christianity will remain an abstraction or an aspiration unless it becomes actual, concrete, in a Church. This Church will be neither Catholic nor Protestant; it will be the

Church of Christ. It will arise (in ways which Macchioro does not attempt to describe) as a synthesis or "syncretism" of the historical churches, a multiplication *ad infinitum* of that church which the Master defined in saying—Wherever two or three come together in my name, there am I. The true Church of Christ!

The Christian consciousness boldly attempts to annul two thousand years of history. Science cannot annul a year or a day, but faith is above time, and by a wonderful paradox, finds progress in regress, the new in the old, life in what seems dead. From among the hosts of those who perished in the Great War, there appears the figure of One who died two thousand years ago, and who it is said is risen again. Christ is risen! The spirit of man worn, tortured, baffled, annuls time, and returns directly and spontaneously, to Jesus.

Once before the attempt was made to return to Jesus. But the Reformers really stopped short at Paul. Lutheranism and Calvinism were both forms of Paulinism. And even to day the Christian believer is instructed that in order to reach the Saviour he must travel by way of Paul. But Paulinism no longer helps, for Paulinism has become Dogmatism, Confessionalism, the symbol of a church theology which intervenes between man and Christ. To make an "integral" return to Christ, a final step backward has to be taken, from Paul to Jesus. Throughout the world there is a great and growing movement of religious faith which seeks to get behind orthodoxies and heterodoxies, theologies and churchisms, to the faith which alone can save man and the world. And true faith is action, not thinking merely or vague aspiration. Humanity has need of action, and of an ideal which can be translated into direct action. After the fevers and fanaticisms of the war, there arises before the clarified vision of humanity, an ideal very different from the gross materialisms which ruled the thoughts and governed the acts of the preceding generations of men. Out of the tragic catharsis, the spirit of the new time turns for healing to the Spirit of the Son of Man. God has become Man and in becoming human, reveals himself as most truly divine. Thus at the end of that colossal drama which has lasted nearly twenty centuries, and which began with his death, Jesus appears again from the tomb which history has built over him and about him, dividing those whom he had brought together, and making hatred flourish where he had sown the seeds of love and peace.

SPINOZA.

By Professor J. Alexander Gunn, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D.
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*O'était un homme doux, de chétive santé,
Qui, tout en polissant des verres de lunettes,
Mit l'essence divine en formules très nettes,
Si nettes que le monde en fut épouvanté.*

*Ce sage démontrait avec simplicité
Que le bien et le mal sont d'antiques sornettes,
Et les livres mortels d'humbles marionnettes
Dont le fil est aux mains de la nécessité.*

*Vieux admirateur de la sainte Ecriture,
Il n'y voulait pas voir un dieu contre nature;
A quoi la synagogue en rage s'opposa,*

*Loin d'elle, polissant des verres de lunettes,
Il aidait les savants à compter les planètes,
C'était un homme doux, Baruch de Spinoza.*

—Sully-Prudhomme.

I.

NO subject is so intensely and intimately bound up with the history of its own development as philosophy. Students of philosophy must always be to some extent at least students of the history of philosophy.

While keeping abreast of all the neo-critical, neo-spiritualist and neo-realist currents of contemporary thought they must not neglect to dip again into the best that has been thought and said by the classic thinkers. After all, they occupied themselves with the great problems of human life and in so far as they did this, whatever be their century, they possess for us an eternal significance, which transcends the mere dates of History or the paltry process of Time.

Few tasks are more interesting for the student of philosophy than to observe the revival of interest in some thinker long since dead, to see the renewed appreciation of his thought and to work out its significance for our contemporary speculations. Such a revival is now taking place in regard to one of the greatest of our metaphysicians, BENEDICTUS né BARUCH SPINOZA.

Spinoza has contributed not only to metaphysical enquiry but to ethical psychological religious and political thought. His metaphysics must appeal to the man of science in spite of Newton's warning, "Physics, beware of metaphysics," and to all those, happily an increasing number, who find themselves urged to an interest in philosophy by their study of physics or biology. The grandeur of his conceptions must impress the religious mind. His analysis of the human mind discloses in a shrewd but less fantastic manner the operations of human passion about which we are hearing so much to-day in terms of "the unconscious" and "psycho-analysis." Again,

in the realm of political thought Spinoza's discussions of revolution, of co-operation within the state, of the morality of states, are questions peculiarly relevant to present day conditions and have a direct bearing upon much that is going on in the minds and hearts of reflective citizens.

It is significant that quite recently an International Society has been founded for the special study of Spinoza's doctrines. The seat of the "Societas Spinozana" is fittingly, at The Hague* This is appropriate to its international character for science and philosophy are international. "La Science," remarked Pasteur, "n'a pas de patrie." Philosophy too has no chosen fatherland. But the selection of The Hague is fitting, also because it was there that Spinoza spent a great portion of his short life.

Some understanding of the times in which he lived is essential in order to appreciate not only his place in the development of human thought but also his personal difficulties in his fight for "freedom of philosophising" and in his attempts to publish his own work. A very few facts about his interesting life must suffice here, owing to the limits of space.

Baruch Spinoza was born in the same year as Locke (1632), and was partly contemporary with Hobbes. He was born in Amsterdam, whither his grandparents had fled from the persecution of the Jews in Spain and Portugal. Descartes lived and published his work in the same country. The *Essais* of Descartes (including the famous *Discours de la Méthode*) appeared from a Leyden press when Spinoza was five years old. Descartes died in 1650, aged fifty-six, when Spinoza was a youth of eighteen. His training was Jewish, but he was excommunicated by the Synagogue for heresy. The men of the Synagogue remained as Arnold says, children of Israel, while Baruch became a child of the modern world and changed his name to Benedictus. He maintained himself by grinding lenses, an occupation, which, while important at that time in relation to the new development of the telescope must have hastened his death from phthisis. After an early exposition of Descartes' philosophy he wrote a *Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-being*, which remained lost for two centuries. It was found in the sixties of the last century in two MSS., the older of which bears a title characteristic of that time, reading:—"Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-being, previously written in the Latin tongue by B.D.S. for the use of his disciples who wanted to devote themselves to the study of Ethics and true Philosophy, and now trans-

*Already two "Annuals" have been issued by the Society, "Chronicon Spinozana MCMXXI" and "MCMXXII" also two volumes in a series the "Bibliotheca Spinozana."

lated into the Dutch language for the use of the lovers of Truth and Virtue; so that they who spout so much about it and put their dirt and filth into the hands of simpletons as though it were ambergris, may just have their mouths stopped and cease to profane what they do not understand, God, themselves, and how to help people to have regard for each others well-being and how to heal those whose mind is sick, in a spirit of tenderness and tolerance after the example of the Lord Christ our best Teacher."

Then he began his *Ethics* but laid it aside in order to write his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, which was published in 1670. It may seem strange to us that a thinker should approach the field of politics through the arena of biblical criticism. But it must be remembered that toleration was no great feature of the religious and political life of those times. Religion and politics were bound together in a union disastrous for the spread of liberty and the progress of free thought. Jan de Witt, who was friendly with Spinoza, supported and encouraged in Holland a more enlightened policy in Church and State, urged to toleration, and the disestablishment of the Church. The clergy regarded philosophy as rank heresy, and the claims of humanism as the claims of the devil. They utterly abhorred the notion of disunion of Church and State. "Moses and Aaron, the Sword and the Word, go hand in hand; What God hath joined let no man put asunder." Thus it was that Spinoza, anxious to defend freedom of thought and speech, took this line of direct action, carrying his arguments into the sacred arena of the clerics themselves, the Old Testament Scriptures whose real spirit the clergy missed or ignored. In an intolerant age he wished to work out a political theory having toleration and "freedom of philosophising" as its basis. His treatise was translated into English the year after the English Revolution (1689) and was then described as "A Treatise, partly theological, partly political, in which are set forth certain discussions to show that freedom of thought and speech not only may without prejudice to piety and the public peace be granted, but also may not without danger to the same be withheld."*

A storm of controversy was raised in Holland by this anonymous publication. European War did not make Spinoza's life any more tranquil and to the epithet of "atheist," was added that of "spy," after his visit to the French Army camp. He had been befriended by Jan de Witt and the brutal murder of Jan and his brother affected Spinoza exceedingly. To this was added the news

*In an article "Spinoza and Present Day Politics," this treatise and the unfinished Political Treatise were discussed by the writer in the "Contemporary Review," July, 1921.

that his earliest Gentile friend Van den Enden had been hanged in front of the Bastille, in Paris. He showed his independent spirit by refusing the patronage of Louis XIV. and by declining the Chair of Philosophy at Heidelberg as he could not sincerely accept the conditions. He was visited by Leibnitz who was curious about his work, but owing to Spinoza's great unpopularity Leibnitz did not openly acknowledge the acquaintance. Signs of his approaching death urged him to concentrate upon the task of finishing the "*magnum opus*," *The Ethics*. His *Tractatus* had been denounced and prohibited under the Orange regime and considerable hostility was aroused by the clergy. Consequently it became impossible for him to publish his *Ethics*. He began a *Political Treatise*, which he never finished.

The end came in 1677 in the tranquil and humble home of the Van der Spijcks, with whom he lodged and boarded in all-too-meagre fashion, and who venerated his memory as that of a man, who whatever his intellectual ideas might be, was in Sully-Prudhomme's phrase, "*un homme doux*."

II.

The influences which acted upon the mind of Spinoza were in the main two, Judaism and the new Philosophy particularly that of Descartes. It should also be noted that politically he is indebted to some extent to Hobbes, (whose *Leviathan* appeared the year after Descartes' death) to Grotius and Machiavelli.

The religious side of his nature found kinship and fellowship among the Collegiants. After the severance from the Synagogue Spinoza never connected himself officially with any religious body, but he seems to have been in some degree influenced by this small sect of Rijnsburgers, among whom for a time he dwelt. Their religion was simple and undogmatic, and the spirit of their lives akin to that shown by the Society of Friends or Quakers. No doubt he found their intellectual and spiritual freedom, their inwardness of religion, their peaceable disposition and simple piety congenial to his soul. After his death his posthumous works were secretly edited by his friends, Schuller, Meyer, and Jelles, under the protection of the buildings of the Collegiant Orphanage, and published anonymously. Although Spinoza was excommunicated at the age of twenty-four, it must be remembered that by that time he had undergone much of the training necessary for a Rabbi. Many of the Jewish conceptions of God and The Universe as set out in the Old Testament, in the Talmud and Cabbala remained with him. His uncompromising monism was partly the fruit of his earlier monotheism. Judaism had always stood for belief in One God upon whom nature and man both depended. In his development of these

ideas as well as in his rationalistic criticism he was influenced by mediaeval Jewish philosophers dating from the eleventh to the fifteenth century, Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, Gersonides, and Kreshka.

The New Philosophy made a powerful appeal to his mind. Bruno, who in 1600 perished as a martyr for thought, exercised some influence, but Spinoza rejected Bruno's teleology. He wrote an exposition of Descartes' philosophy which was the only book published during his lifetime with his name upon it. It has been argued whether Spinoza was ever a disciple of Descartes.* Sigwart suggested he was not; Avenarius firmly asserted that Spinoza was never a Cartesian. This appears a correct view for Spinoza in his exposition of Descartes points out features of disagreement. Nevertheless the scientific work and method connected with Cartesianism appealed very much to Spinoza.

III.

It is important for a proper appreciation of Spinoza's metaphysics to realise that it marked an unmistakable advance upon Cartesianism. Descartes had indeed begun a new era in the history of human thought by his rejection of the vague subtleties and vast assumptions of the mediaeval schoolmen, but his thought, heroic in its kind, left certain problems to be solved which were inherent in it. For example Descartes spoke of two distinct substances, *Res cogitans* and *Res extensa*. Thought and Matter. Yet this postulation of two substances was in itself inconsistent with his own definition of substance. It is this which explains the emphasis laid repeatedly by Spinoza upon his own principle, that there is and can be only one substance. We may note, however, that Descartes at least did the service of giving mind the rank of substance. This was an important point, for he was writing at a time when the mechanical and materialistic conceptions of nature were growing, and many thinkers gave to those a much wider and more thorough application than Descartes would allow. His English contemporary Hobbes simplified the problem by abolishing the difficulty of dualism by taking the view that all reality was materialistic in character. Descartes avoided the simplicity of this crude assertion by giving mind an existence along with matter. He tended, however, to consider mind in abstraction from matter. We must remember that we only know mind in association with matter, and that a special variety of matter, *living* matter.

It is the peculiar merit of Spinoza that he realised the crude dualism involved in Descartes' views, but did not proceed to a simple

*Quite recently this has been discussed in "*Mind*" (1923) by Dr. L. Roth (English Secretary of the *Societas Spinozana*).

solution by asserting a "monism" of matter or of mind alone. For Spinoza reality was not to be summed up in Materialism or Idealism, nor in a Dualism referring to both. For him reality was a Unity. His philosophy was monistic, not dualistic. The universe, as he viewed it, was not simply material, but at one and the same time mental in character. We must admit that Spinoza is difficult to follow on the relation of the two attributes and he must have felt the difficulty of the problem himself. He never flinched, however, from the assertion that mind and matter are not two substances (as in the Cartesian philosophy), but enunciated the view that they are attributes of one substance, manifestations of one reality.

There were in the Cartesian system certain assertions arising from the dualistic view of mind and matter which had certain implications of a kind which Spinoza readily saw. On the view of Descartes there were grave difficulties involved in the treatment of the problem of the precise relation of matter and mind in the case where those two phenomena appeared together. The behaviour of matter alone could be explained simply by a reference to mechanical principles. The outcome of this difficulty was the enunciation of the principle of parallelism. Psycho-physical parallelism is a doctrine which has given rise to considerable discussion and controversy ever since. Descartes' statements appeared crude and fantastically theological. The Occasionalists offered their explanations, again bringing in the Deity as a kind of *deus ex machinâ* to conceal their ignorance. Leibnitz later hazarded the suggestion of the two clocks keeping the same time independently.

For Spinoza with his monistic view of mind and matter the problem does not present itself in the same manner. He has his own peculiar difficulties, however, which arise from his doctrine that there is one fact which we break into two aspects calling one mental and the other material. This view puts theories of correspondence, parallelism or interaction out of court. However much parallelism has appeared useful as a method of investigation or study it is most certainly not the final word on the problem of mind and matter. It accepts the difficulty and leaves it very much where it was in the time of the Cartesians with the theological references, those refuges of ignorance, deleted. Reality for Spinoza is both material and mental. He is obliged, however, to notice certain points about these two aspects of reality. On the one side we have the thought-aspect, on the other, the material-aspect. We may say we have thought and extension. Below this we can write in a further item, the thought of a thought or consciousness having thought or itself as object, but we cannot carry this out in regard to the material-aspect. Any increasing of the items on that side would give us nonsense. There is

no sense in the "extension of extension," as there is in "consciousness of consciousness." This reveals a fundamental difference. Thought or consciousness can not only have extension as an object, but can also have thought or consciousness (itself) as its object. Consciousness can be self-conscious but matter cannot be self-extended. This leads to the recognition of consciousness as superior to matter in man. Through it he masters body. By adequate ideas he masters passion.

Yet we find Spinoza speaking of mind as equivalent to the idea of body as if consciousness cannot envisage reality under thought but only under extension.* Nevertheless by his insistence on the mental and material being aspects of one fact he considerably advances philosophical thought from the dualism in which Descartes left this problem.

It remains for us to note another line of advance on a metaphysical question beyond Descartes. This is in regard to the problem of motion. In the Cartesian metaphysics motion is a mode or state of matter imparted to matter by God. Empty space was nothing and matter was of course conceived as existing in three dimensions. Spinoza looked on matter not as a substance, but as an attribute of reality and he conceived of motion and rest as universals or infinite modes. Descartes began with his *res extensa* and was unable to get motion introduced save by the hand of God, thus making the Deity serve again as a mere "*deus ex machinâ*" in the Cartesian drama. Spinoza made a great advance in science and metaphysics by denying that motion was "put into" immobile matter externally by a creative act of God, and affirming in place of this the doctrine that matter is motion and rest. Here again he purged from philosophical speculation the unnecessary theological impositions of the schoolmen from which even Descartes, revolutionary as he was, had been unable or unwilling to rid himself.

The age was an age of geometrical methods and the view of motion taken by thinkers of that century was from the standpoint of geometry rather than that of physics. That is to say, they conceived a motion rather too simply as change of place. Change, however, implies time, and of this factor Spinoza has very little to say. His material world is summed up in three dimensions. Professor Alexander has shrewdly suggested that Spinoza should have included time as a fourth dimension and as an attribute of the deity.*

*He also refers to an emotion as an idea of a modification of a body. This is passivity of mind, while he shows that activity of mind produces adequate ideas and hence control of emotions.

The importance of the idea of time in metaphysics is, however, a relatively recent development in philosophical thought. In the history of the development of philosophy Spinoza must be ranked with those who assert with Plato the eternal aspects of the universe. He begins with the Infinite and Eternal and not with the things which are temporal and finite, and he returns to look on all things from the standpoint of eternity.

IV.

Spinoza belongs to the company of those who during their lifetime and for years afterwards have been ignored or misunderstood by their fellow-men. His daring thought was not in harmony with the general trend of speculation at the time, either in philosophical or religious circles. Owing no allegiance to any ready-made body of doctrine, he sought truth with a free soul and with steadfast aim. His predecessor had not been so brave. Descartes, after professing to take the greatest pains to free himself from pre-suppositions, remarked that he did not wish to criticise revealed truth. "We ought to prefer the Divine authority to our perception; what God has revealed is incomparably more certain than anything else." It is true that much of this submission was tinged with irony, but it was submission. Descartes was deferential to the dogmas of established religion, and to the theological doctrines of the Sorbonne. For example, he assumes God's wisdom and goodness and His transcendent nature. Spinoza's independent attitude stands in marked contrast to this. He does not yield an inch of ground and is uncompromising in his statement of what he conceives to be the truth, which will make men free. In the storm raised against Spinoza's thought we really see the bursting of the thunder-cloud which had been hanging over the whole Cartesian philosophy. Delayed from bursting over the head of Descartes, owing to his not going the full length of his premises, it broke with full fury on Spinoza when he, with fuller and deeper insight into these principles, bore them to their logical conclusion. Spinoza's contemporaries regarded his moral character as admirable, his manual work as the best of its kind, but on account of his philosophy, they assailed him as a blasphemer and an atheist. Feeling reached a high pitch even during his lifetime, as we have seen. After his death it abated nothing, and dignitaries of the Church visited his grave in order to spit upon it. Bayle's article in his dictionary was a wretched libel, but it set the tone for contemporaries and it established the conventional attitude adopted to Spinoza's

*In his published lecture on "Spinoza and Time." For a discussion of the difficulties bound up with Descartes' view of motion, see Kemp Smith's "Studies in Cartesian Philosophy." See also Alexander's "Space, Time, and Deity."

work for many years. Consequently Spinoza was more scorned than read and was violently denounced by many who would not take time or trouble to understand him. This is revealed in remarks by Voltaire and Hume, which serve to show the prevailing temper of the time. Voltaire thought it strange that a man of such an admirable character as Spinoza could hold opinions as vicious and abominable as they were maintained to be. Hume in his *Treatise on Human Nature* (IV, 5) published in 1739, refers (no doubt with a hidden irony) to his "hideous hypothesis" and to "all those sentiments for which Spinoza is universally infamous." Indeed, we find that not a single writer of the century which followed the death of our philosopher even attempted to deal with him in any serious manner. Theologians in all countries (e.g., Howe, the light of English Nonconformity at the time) assailed him in wordy but worthless volumes, but it is doubtful if any of them had even read the *Ethics* in full. Even the philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, take no great notice of Spinoza; they just mention him. Leibnitz as we have seen preserved a culpable silence. Even Kant himself missed his influence, although he has a word or two concerning him. Spinoza had not come to his own, and it is somewhat strange to observe that when he did, it was not through the appreciation of philosophers as such. It was to poets and literary men that his appeal won home.

The first man who seems to have realised the value of Spinoza's thought was Lessing (1729-1781), the reviver of literature and criticism in Germany. Then we know that Goethe (1749-1832) was considerably influenced by Spinoza.* Since that time he has been widely read and extensively studied in German. His introduction into England was the work of Coleridge. Wordsworth came, like Goethe, under his spell, and if we accept the laughable "Spy-Nosy" story, then the earliest discussions in this country which attempted to bring out the value of Spinoza's work took place between Coleridge and Wordsworth. Much in Wordsworth's poetry echoes Spinoza's pantheism. Maurice brought him to the notice of English theologians, while Froude and Matthew Arnold contributed to his increasing popularity.

Spinoza was by this time coming to have his merits recognised. The bi-centenary of his death in 1877 witnessed scenes which offered a marked contrast to the events of 1677. At The Hague, public international celebrations were held in his honour, one of the Princes of Orange presiding. A monument was unveiled and an

*Robert Hering: *Spinoza im Jungen Goethe*. A German thesis in the collected volume *Abhandlungen ueber Wieland, Goethe und Schiller*

inspiring address, entitled, "*Spinoza, 1677 and 1877*" was delivered by Ernest Renan, who was then at the height of his fame at the College de France. Three days later a special lecture was delivered at the University of Leyden by Professor Land (of the Chair of Philosophy in the University) which now constitutes a valuable introduction to Spinoza. This was not all. An international Committee was constituted to erect a statue to his honour. In 1880 this was finished and unveiled, an oration being delivered on the occasion by Dr. Van Vloten. The surplus of international subscriptions was devoted to the publication of a standard edition of his works under the joint editorship of Professor Land and Dr. Van Vloten.

Thus Spinoza's merit has after long delay become recognised. "In spite of his seclusion, in spite of the shortness of his career, in spite of the hostility of the dispensers of renown in the 18th century, of Voltaire's disparagement and Bayle's detraction, in spite of the repellant form which he has given to his principal work, in spite of the exterior semblance of a rigid dogmatism alien to the most essential tendencies of modern philosophy, in spite, finally, of the immense weight of disfavour cast upon him by the long-repeated charge of atheism, Spinoza's name has silently risen in importance, the man and his work have attracted a steadily increasing notice and bid fair to become soon what they deserve to become in the history of modern philosophy, the central point of interest."* We do not care to say with Arnold that Spinoza's problems have become *the* central point of interest, yet it is obvious that his influence has been extremely important. His fellow-Jew, Heine, coupling a witty reference to Spinoza's method of livelihood with the influence of his work on subsequent thinkers says, "All our modern philosophers, though often perhaps unconsciously, see through the glasses which Baruch Spinoza ground."

At the present day we find the study of Spinoza making an increasing appeal to the scientific mind. There are various reasons for this. It is one of Spinoza's chief merits that, at the time when Physical Science herself was but groping after the conception of law as a working hypothesis, he clearly stated and developed this notion of the universality of law, the relation of each object to Nature as a whole, as the fundamental principle of all existence and all knowledge of the universe. Man himself must not be regarded as apart from that universality of law which constitutes the nature of the universe. To isolate him from the operation of such law would be to take him out of his place in the cosmos, and away from God, thus involving, not man's freedom, but his annihilation.

*Matthew Arnold in his *Essay on Spinoza*.

Nature, moreover, is the whole of reality, not merely the material universe. All dependence is necessitated but not all dependence is mechanical. There is no ground for regarding the necessity which makes physical objects to be what they are and to act as they do, as the exemplar of all necessity whatever. Rather the greater the necessity which characterises any thing or creature then the greater degree of reality does it possess. The more real it is, the more freedom does it enjoy, the more power it has to act and not merely to suffer. Thus Spinoza claims that the highest type of necessity is not in the physical world but in rational beings, especially free men, because they "cannot help" loving virtue and loving God. Thus freedom is not opposed to necessity.

Spinoza is thoroughly opposed to the view that man is the end of nature. The world and man do not stand in the relation to one another of means and end. This is another of the points in Spinoza's doctrine which has endeared him to modern scientists who have shown us that man is not the end of nature, that the stars were not made to be a lamp for his feet, nor the darkness to lull him to slumber. The criterion of nature is not the comfort or convenience of human beings. The universe as a whole has no moral significance or character, ethical predicates we cannot apply to it, it cannot be praised or blamed. To speak of it as the best of all possible worlds would be as meaningless as calling it the worst. In his denial of teleology, that things have been made for an end, his point is that all things have been made for one another and that any particular thing is only relative to and intelligible in relation to the whole cosmos with its universal laws which make it and keep it part of that whole. In refusing to admit that God acts with any end in view, he adds, "other than himself." All determination with him must be self-determination. Spinoza revolted really from that external type of teleology which is too narrowly centred in man. His own self-realising system, however, has not emancipated itself from teleology but it is of a kind which might well be styled, as Mr. Joachim remarks, "immanent teleology." Moreover, his insistence on the perfecting of man as free and rational involves the adoption of a teleological point of view.

His One Substance is really nothing but the principle of causality in another form. It is highly abstract, and he is unable to relate the attributes to the Substance. The remark has been made that in its swallowing up of all differences and distinctions it resembles the den of the lion, to which many steps lead, but from which none lead away. The truth is that in Spinoza's system there is no room for one vitally important thing, Spinoza himself. In it

human individuality is at a discount. Here we face the old problem of the One and the Many. The chief defect of Spinoza's philosophy is that it fails to do justice to the many, who are in danger of losing their distinct individuality in the unity of the one Substance or God. It was this defect, we may remark in passing, which Leibnitz endeavoured to remedy. The French thinker, Charles Renouvier, a great champion of "personality" and a severe opponent of Pantheism and kindred views well sums up this aspect of Spinoza's doctrine. "C'est la plus belle des doctrines de la Chose. Mieux que dans l'antiquité le stoicien, le Spinosiste vise à cette personnalité contradictoire, la contemplation de l'individual et du temporel sous l'aspect de l'universel et de l'éternel, en consentant au sacrifice de sa conscience individuelle. Mais il n'y a de conscience qu'individuelle l'extinction de l'individualité serait celle de la représentation, même en Dieu, Dieu ne pouvant connaître sa création qu'autant qu'il s'en distingue."*

V.

In reference to Spinoza's Ethics, it has been argued that his doctrine involves the reduction of all virtue to intellectual virtue, the identification of the good will with clear intelligence and the subordination of both moral and political obligation to the apprehension of truth. It has further been objected that Spinoza's synthesis of intellectual love is nonsensical, since intellect and emotion are not one and the same thing, and that really his "Love" is only another name for a purely intellectual knowledge, and his ethic is one which only appeals to philosophers or intellectual people. In answer to this it can be said that Spinoza realises no other absolute good than the knowledge or intellectual love of God; this knowledge is the essence of virtue and neither moral duty nor political obligations have ultimate value, unless they serve and foster the development of free intelligence in men. We must not overlook the important fact that for Spinoza will and intellect are one and the same. We cannot really *know* the better and do the worse. All genuine knowledge is practical as well as theoretical. We cannot really know and not act on our knowledge. Moreover, the knowledge which is virtue includes knowledge of ourselves, as we are by ourselves and in relation to the whole of reality. It is rather an attitude of soul or spirit, a religious temper, than an aggregate of intellectual attainments. For Spinoza, as for Socrates, virtue is knowledge, but its supreme value lies in the fact that it makes virtue pos-

**Histoire et Solution des Problèmes métaphysiques*, p. 410. On Renouvier and his views, see the writer's "Modern French Philosophy."

sible. It is the intellectual vision of all things in the cosmos, *sub specie aeternitatis*, in the light of their divine unity and necessity, that renders man free from the bondage of passion. All knowledge, however speculative, has a moral value. This is a contrast to the English tendency to diminish the ardour of the pursuit of truth, by appeals to faith in the moral life, and by reliance on the general "common sense" of mankind for the solution of speculative problems.

From the standpoint of social ethics his insistence on co-operation as the basis of the life of man socially and no less politically is valuable. Green, it is true, quarrels on technical grounds with his doctrine of *Jus*, but that is not of much importance, for Spinoza was less interested than Hobbes in speculating on the origin of government, what concerned him more was its existence and above all its maintenance. His political doctrines have an important place in the development of political theory from the Renaissance to Rousseau. It is remarkable that Spinoza's theories have not supplemented the study of Hobbes to a greater degree. He is really much more English than the English thinker, paradoxical though this statement may sound. His view of the state is one which appeals much more to Englishmen than the absolutism of Hobbes ever can do, and it is truer to political history and to psychology* Spinoza is no blind worshipper of the state; while on the other hand his objections to Revolution bring him into line with the characteristically English liking for a freedom slowly broadening from precedent to precedent.

In his plea for toleration, for humanism and rationalism, he stands related on the one hand to Erasmus and the Humanists of the Renaissance, and on the other to critics like Baur and Strauss. He attacked that professional theology which has been styled "a pretended science of teaching God Almighty His own business," by insisting that God Almighty knew His own business best and he was consequently denounced as a blasphemer, an atheist and a scoffer at religion. It must be remembered that the term atheist is relative to a conception of God. Socrates and the early Christians were deemed by their accusers "atheists." The applicability of the term is dependent on our definition of Theism. We may for the purpose of discussion and an elucidation of Spinoza's exact position, recall Kant's dictum on this point. He says in his *Critique of Pure Reason*,** "We are wont to understand by the term 'God' not merely an eternal

*Given certain premises regarding human nature, Hobbes is perfectly logical and convincing. His premises are based on a narrow and erroneous psychology. Spinoza realised this, and took a broader and truer view.

** Meiklejohn's Translation, Bohn, p. 388.

nature, the operations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme Being, who is the free and intelligent author of all things, and it is this latter view alone that can be of interest to humanity." He goes on to say that, "in strict rigour," we should deny to the man who styles himself a "Deist" any belief in God at all, and regard him merely as the maintainer of the existence of a primal Being or Thing, the supreme cause of all other things. But, as no one ought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel himself justified in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied its truth and asserted the opposite, it is more correct, as it is less harsh, to say, the Deist believes in a God, the Theist in a living God."

In the light of such a statement what are we to say of Spinoza? It will be evident that we cannot term his thought that of a Theist. For instance, although he maintains God to be the cause of all things in both their essence and their existence, we cannot ascribe to Him either "intellect" or "will," and there can be nothing whatever in common between His nature and that of His creatures, and if we do employ such terms as "intellect" or "will" they have as little relation to their real meaning as the term "dog" when applied to the star Sirius bears to the barking animal.* He does not allow us to ascribe Life to God and he vehemently opposes all teleology, for of the *Natura Naturans* no characteristics of mind or self-consciousness can be predicted. A divine creator or a divine providence as conventionally understood are both ruled out. He expressly states his divergence from the Cartesian view that mathematical truths owe their certainty to the will of God, a refuge which he regards as "the asylum of ignorance."

The Divine Nature acts because it exists and as it exists, and it can neither be other than it is nor act differently. Everything is pre-determined. Moreover, it has no alternatives and knows neither better nor worse, neither right nor wrong. Values as of good or evil, beauty or ugliness, order or chaos, are entirely relative to our narrow limited human standpoint and are without meaning in relation to the universe as a whole or for God. Yet in spite of his attack on anthropomorphism it must be recognised that the attributes of Extension and Thought with which he credits God are themselves essentially human and he is unable to name or indicate the nature of other divine attributes, although he postulates them as infinite in number.

The fact is, however, that there is far less theological significance in Spinoza's use of the term God than is often supposed and

*On this point there is an interesting discussion by J. Handyside in his Essay on *The Absolute and Intellect* in his Volume the *Historical Method in Ethics and other Essays* (1920).

we must beware of giving to his language a theological meaning which he did not intend. While remembering this, and not classifying Spinoza among the Theists in the Kantian use of that term, we need not entirely empty his words of religious significance, nor style him an atheist because he does not fulfil Kant's criterion of Theism. Spinoza's was a mind and temperament profoundly religious, using that term in the broader and deeper sense. His conclusion to the *Ethics* justifies this statement, and although he could no longer believe in the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob, nor of the Prophets, nor yet accept the Christian view of a loving Father controlling the destinies of his erring human children, yet his love of God, although intellectual, is not devoid of meaning and value or religious significance. Many students of his works have realised this, theologians included, such as Dorner (1809-1884) and Schleiermacher (1768-1834), that upholder of religion as implying essentially dependence and acquiescence, whose words on Spinoza we may quote: "The sublime spirit of the world penetrated him, the infinite was his beginning and his end; the universal his only and eternal love; living in holy innocence and profound humility he contemplated himself in the eternal world and saw that he too was for that world a mirror worthy of love; he was full of religion and full of the Holy Spirit.*

Nothing hurt him like the mean insinuations of those who disagreed with his metaphysic, urging that his philosophy was dangerous to morality and religion. "Is it, I ask, to cut off religion, to acknowledge God as the supreme Good and thence to conclude that He must be loved with a free soul? To maintain that all our felicity and most perfect freedom consists in that love, that the reward of virtue is virtue and that a blind and impotent soul finds its punishment in its blindness—is this," asks Spinoza, "a denial of all religion?" Spinoza began the revolt, which was accelerated by Goethe, against the orthodox dogma of a fallen human nature and the deist conception of an absentee God.

Man, with "the undying fire" of idealism, faith and hope in his own nature, must work out his own salvation, working his way through errors and suffering. No external redeemer can help him. He will find happiness in so far as he places his attention on things which are high and noble, not mean and sordid, which are eternal and not transient, and the only eternal object is God. Novalis, the German romanticist, styled Spinoza *ein Gott betrunkenener Mann*, "a God-intoxicated man," while Hegel, realising Spinoza's point that God is entirely immanent in the Universe, said that Spinoza

*In his *Rede ueber die Religion*, 1799, p. 47.

was to be convicted, not of theism, but of acosmism, for he denies, not the existence of God, but the existence of the universe as being other than God. Hence those who like to label the thoughts of philosophers have termed his doctrine Pantheism. This, however, means little or nothing, for widely different systems have been so labelled. Better it is to leave labels, whether they be Theist, Pantheist or Atheist. Call him just Spinoza, abandon the fruitless attempt to fit his unique views into pre-arranged moulds of thought, and endeavour instead to understand him and appreciate his message as a whole.

His conception of Divine Determinism is one which is not revolting to the deeply orthodox religions consciousness for which

"God nothing does nor suffers to be done

But thou wouldst do thyself if thou couldst see

The end of all events the same as He."

The absolute determinism of a Spinoza is more acceptable to the religious consciousness than the other extreme in modern philosophy, the absolute contingency of a Bergson. But the very comfort of the Calvinist in accepting a doctrine of determinism is bound up with the belief that all has been determined by the highest wisdom and goodness. It is the fact that no such belief is bound up with Spinoza's determinism which makes his "Free man's worship" appear all the nobler and more heroic. He will love God, like Job, "even though he slay him," for his love of God demands and expects no love in return. He rises to an intuition in which he sees God in all things and all things in God. His love for God is part of the infinite, divine love wherewith God loves Himself. There was undoubtedly something of the mystic about Spinoza and this led to his giving a religious expression to most of his ideas. It was this which endeared him to spirits such as Goethe, and Lessing, Coleridge, and Wordsworth. "Woe to him," said Renan in his bi-centenary address, "who, in passing, should hurl an insult at this gentle and pensive head! He would be punished as all vulgar souls are punished, by his very vulgarity and by his incapacity to feel what is divine. This man from his granite pedestal will point out to all men the way to blessedness which he found . . . The truest vision ever had of God came, perhaps, to him." We, at a still greater distance of time can feel that his mouth has been touched with a live coal from off the divine altar. However intellectual he seems, a roseate hue of noble feeling stains the white radiance of the eternal truths he endeavours to grasp and to make clear to us.

In Spinoza's thought we find the analysis of the scientific student, combined with the synthesis of the philosopher, and the fervour of the religious soul. His work glows with a mystic fire which

colours all his thought, metaphysical and political. If we may not call him, as Dr. Wolf has well remarked, a priest of the most high God, yet we may find in him a prophet of the power that makes for righteousness.

Pantheist he has been styled, but his pantheism, if we permit the name at all is not that superficial doctrine of a vague divine spirit pervading all things, but a clearer doctrine that all things are in God and are manifestations of Him.

Some criticism can be turned upon his conception of *amor intellectualis Dei*, his "intellectual love of God." The union of the terms *amor* and *intellectualis* may well appear a dangerous attempt at a union of opposites or at least of things which are essentially different. The word "amor" we may recollect had such a passionate, sensual meaning that Jerome was unable to use it for his Latin translation of St. Paul and employed instead the more sober term "caritas." Spinoza, however, is concerned with an expression which will unite at once the passionate religious ardour of the mystic with the severe and sober attitude of the philosopher and scientist.

Hence his attempt at the synthesis of "love" and "intellect." It can be objected that passion can never be merely an intellectual love any more than individual lovers can find entire expression for their feelings in merely so-called Platonic friendship. We love an object and hence consider it lovable or lovely. We know the emotion by feeling it. We know God by our loving, and not vice-versa. The religious consciousness demands from the intellectual a construction of the idea of God, it is true. But we do not love the idea. It is rather that we demand the idea to be constructed because we already love. Modern psychology is showing that many of our conceptions are reached by a rationalising process which *succeeds* the emotional experience in point of time, but is thereafter put forward as a reason for the emotion or desire, not as it really is, a product created by the intellect, subsequent to the experience of the emotion, as an attempt at rational explanation.

These considerations raise the further question as to whether Spinoza's view of the emotions is not too intellectual, and his intellectual love of God resolves itself into a supreme aesthetic and intellectual satisfaction, as a frankly scientific passion but not one to be equated precisely with the religious passion. In speaking of religion, Spinoza had stated that "whatever we desire to do of which we are cause in so far as we have the idea of God or know God, I set down to religion." Bearing in mind this short definition of a subject which has always presented grave difficulties of definition (at any rate of a *unanimous* kind) we ask whether the God for whom we may conceive the "*amor intellectualis*" (intellectual love)

is the same as, or other than the object of religious worship? This is an interesting and vital question for the student of Spinoza's philosophy and it must be faced. We have already pointed out that the reader of Spinoza must beware of reading into the terminology more theology than is really intended. Also the chief defect in Spinoza's system has been commented upon, namely the fact that strictly speaking, there is no room in it for Spinoza himself as a personality. The danger of the absorption of all personalities into a vast and impersonal Totality is a real one. Now in Spinoza's view personality is a finite mode, God is a totality but not a Personality.

We have two courses open to us in this connection, two possible points of view, from which we must select one. Either we shall say that our highest category is that of Personality and that we must not only love the highest when we see it but must ascribe that highest category to the All-Highest itself. Then we assert a belief in the existence of a Personal Deity. Or, on the other hand, we may take the line that the ground of personality need not be and is not itself personal. Spinoza's view is certainly the latter, for him personality is a finite mode. We must be clear on the issue of these two divergent lines of thought. If we follow out the former then God for us will be the object of reverence and worship. We may love Him and He us. Our love of God, however, intellectually expressed, will be a relation to the object of worship. This is not Spinoza's view. For him the Deity is not personal and we cannot equate "God" in his sense with the object of religious worship. Whichever we choose, whether, we go with Spinoza or his subsequent antagonist, Renouvier,* we must be clear on the issue and must realise that we cannot have it both ways, we must choose between the one line of thought on this point and the other.

God for Spinoza is a term synonymous with reality. His use of the word makes it co-extensive with reality. On closer examination of his phraseology, however, an interesting distinction arises. He uses two terms, *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. The first expresses God operating as a free cause while the second is employed for the universe considered as the effect of God's causality. We may recall here his early belief which caused difficulty at the Synagogue. This was his assertion that God had a material body, that body being, so he showed himself to mean, the universe. This corresponds to *natura naturata*. The mind or soul of God, the essence of his deity lies in the *élan vital* the *nisus* or *conatus*,

*Renouvier strongly maintained the Personality of the Deity. He was obliged, however, to admit the truth of Spinoza's argument that personality was essentially a finite quality. Hence Renouvier conceived of God as personal, but finite.

natura naturans. We may if we care, regard this divine element of dynamic force as worthy of reverence or worship while refusing to worship "the thing that is," *natura naturata*. The use of the term God to cover both, as in Spinoza, is distinctly confusing for modern theology and philosophy. It covers a point which is apt to be lost or overlooked. God himself may be only realising himself or creating his divinity in the process of the universe.*

Spinoza says quite deliberately one *substance* not one *cause*. For he desires to stress not a single link but a totality. The universe is not a mere aggregate of parts, it is a whole which is self-existing, self-sufficing, and self-determining.

Finite things are modifications of the one substance. All things which are, are in God, and He is infinite. Spinoza characteristically enough begins with the Infinite, not with the finite. His difficulty is not to reach the Infinite, but rather to get from the Infinite to finite things, and he passes over *the* question of metaphysics, *par excellence*, that ultimate question, which for us can only be answered speculatively, if at all, the question, "Why *are* there finite things?"

His thought remains one of the classics of philosophy and offers a contrast on a fundamental point to the modern "philosophy of change." For Spinoza change is but an aspect of reality, a reality which abides. Behind all changes there lies a permanent, enduring Reality of which change is a manifestation. Spinoza will not tolerate the paradox that the only permanence is change.

He stands much nearer to Plato than to Bergson and those two thinkers represent most clearly contrasting points of view. These contradictory standpoints are consequent upon diverse attitudes towards the problem of Time and its Reality. This is a problem with which we may deal on some other occasion, sufficient is it here to say that it is one which is of vital significance for contemporary philosophy.

Spinoza looks upon Time as merely a mode of thinking things. Duration is the attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things. Duration therefore is definitely related to existence, but not, to the ultimate nature or essence of reality. There is, however, as Mr. Joachim shrewdly points out at the end of his *Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, some inconsistency involved in Spinoza's employment of the term Duration. We see this when we investigate carefully some of his pages on the relation of Eternity and the Mind.

*Compare on this point Renan, *Fragments Philosophiques*; Bergson, *Évolution Créatrice*; and Alexander, *Space, Time, and Deity*; Vol. 2.

Eternity as Spinoza uses the term is not mere indefinite length of time. As we have said, Duration cannot be a feature of the Eternal. Elsewhere Spinoza speaks of Time as a cutting up of Duration; as a picture or image of persistent duration. In one place he uses "duration" in place of "eternity." In another he explicitly excludes time and duration from the Eternal. Eternity is not Infinite Duration nor can it be expressed in terms of Duration, for Duration is merely existence and not essence or ultimate reality. If God had duration he would be creating himself and becoming more real as time goes on. We cannot even say with correctness that he has existed "from all eternity" for this is to confound eternity with what is merely indefinite duration. Eternity is not a long Time; it involves time-less necessity of being. This is the sense in which Spinoza employs the term Eternal Life. He has no intention of postulating an immortal or future life for the individual person. The human mind is "eternal" in so far as it becomes (through adequate ideas and through the intellectual love of God) a mind which can glorify God *and enjoy Him*. The attainment of this eternal life is "the chief end of man."

Spinoza deserves particular notice to-day, because he drew attention to the fact that all reality is causally connected, and to the fact that all reality is dependent on God. He sees no conflict between the strictly scientific inter-connection of all things and the vision of their unity in God.



PATRIOTISM.

By F. A. W. Gisborne, New Town, Tasmania.

RELIGION and patriotism are terms which, perhaps, more than any others to be found in the English language have suffered abuse and outrage. While originally intended to express high and ennobling ideas they have served as cloaks for hypocrites and political schemers, and have been degraded to justify the wild and immoral designs of fanatics, tyrants and the victims of megalomania. Some of the greatest crimes in history have been committed in their names; and though, happily, in all civilised countries the days of religious persecution are now over, the world has recently seen in Germany, Russia and elsewhere, the most atrocious iniquities perpetrated in the name of patriotism. Owing to its misuse by self-seeking charlatans the latter term has frequently been the mark of the satirist. Dryden reproached Shaftesbury for having "usurped a patriot's all-atoning name," and Fielding rather unkindly described the patriot of his day as the man who "wanted a place," and the tyrant as the man who "had got one." Lookers-on at the game of party politics as it is played in our times may still detect patriots whose words and actions do not tend to falsify the definition of the cynical novelist.

The etymology of the word patriotism is familiar to every one. The close family relationship between the citizen and the nation of which he is a member finds expression in such terms as "fatherland" and "mother-country." The Chinese Emperor of old days was officially designated the "father and mother" of his people, and the admiration of the Russian people for the greatest of their rulers prompted the formal bestowal on him of the title of "father of his country." The ancient patriarchal system was wholly based on the family tie. By a natural sequence of ideas, in course of time, the bond between the child and its parent was extended so as to bind the citizen to the State. Obedience and service had to be rendered in return for protection and support. Just as religion bound together the members of the religious community, so a common love of country united the members of each political society, and, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, a weakening of the sentiment of patriotism among the masses of the population has always been a symptom of approaching national downfall.

The origin of patriotism, like that of many other virtues, may be traced back to the instinct of self-preservation. The primitive clan, or tribe, had no chance to survive unless its members were

united by the closest ties, and acted in complete unison both in peace and war. Two supreme obligations were imposed by necessity on each member of such a community. These were to love his country and to increase its population as much as possible. Patriotism and fecundity were the pillars of the ancient State. Warriors were needed to defend it, and patriotism supplied the moral force which, in war, Napoleon declared to be in relation to physical force as three to one. Thus patriotism in primitive times acted both as a cohesive and an animating force, binding the citizens together, and impelling them to fight to the last, if necessary, to maintain their independence.

Love of country has always prevailed in a more intense form among the citizens of small States than among those of large ones. The reason is obvious. There is a greater necessity for union and the spirit of devotion to common interests in the numerically weak community than in the powerful and populous nation. Increased moral force, therefore, must compensate for lack of physical force. All students of history must have observed how among the ancient Greeks and Romans the sentiment of patriotism, originally so strong as to amount to an actual worship of country, gradually declined as each State enlarged its boundaries and increased its wealth, until at last an excess of prosperity and luxury induced decadence. The flame that blazed so brightly in the days of vigorous youth died away, leaving at last only the glowing embers of ceremonial and tradition. The indomitable spirit of patriotism which raised one small Italian town founded by a band of outlaws to the position of mistress of the world was well expressed in the words placed by Horace in the mouth of the despairing Carthaginian:—

Merses profundo, pulchrior evenit;

Luctere, multa proruēt integrum

Cum laude victorem, geretque

Proelia conjugibus loquenda.

Different indeed was the spirit shown by the degenerate multitudes of Rome when, more than six hundred years later, an enemy less formidable than Hannibal was at their gates.

It has also frequently been noticed that patriotism is a virtue which, as a rule, is more distinctive of peoples inhabiting mountainous or barren countries than those living under more favourable natural conditions. The attachment of the Highlander to his native moors and glens, of the Bedouin to his sandy wastes, and of the Montenegrin to his rugged home is proverbial. The patriotism of

the Swiss peasant has been celebrated by Goldsmith in an exquisite simile:—

*“And as a child, when scaring sounds molest,
Clings close and closer to the mother’s breast,
So the loud tempest and the whirlwind’s roar
But bind him to his native mountains more.”*

Briefly summarised then, the conditions most favourable to the growth of the spirit of patriotism may be said to be poverty, weakness and danger. It is a plant that grows most readily on sterile soil. What are the conditions that operate in an antagonistic manner? These may be stated as opulence and luxury with their attendant selfishness, commercialism, and physical and moral deterioration. That sickly form of sentimentalism which has prompted certain well known English writers and politicians to compare unfavourably the deeds of their own countrymen with those of foreigners, and the excessive humanitarianism characteristic of the man who, in Canning’s scornful phrase, is “the friend of every country but his own,” also operate to the detriment of the patriotic spirit. As a rule, the man who is ashamed of his own country is one of whom his country has good reason to feel ashamed. There is a kind of pseudo-philanthropy, too, which conflicts seriously with the discharge of the highest of civic duties. We frequently nowadays meet with persons who are more solicitous for the welfare of strangers than for that of their own fellow-citizens. Mrs. Jellyby still employs herself at home in making warm clothing for African negroes, while she forgets to cook the family dinner. Mr. Jellyby in Parliament pleads the cause of Greeks, Armenians, and other interesting foreigners, but overlooks the claims of the starving veteran at his own door. How far this enthusiasm for the welfare of humanity is genuine we need not inquire; but inasmuch as the capacity of goodwill each individual possesses is limited, it follows that the more widely his affections are distributed the smaller must be the portion bestowed on each recipient. Patriotism demands to some extent a concentration of benevolence. The cosmopolitan philanthropist may be a very good citizen of the world, but he is a very poor citizen of his own country. And that habit, traceable to a large extent to the unworthy attitude assumed towards their country’s arch-enemy by the Whigs during the Napoleonic wars, of systematically disparaging their own nation, and depreciating its achievements, which has been cultivated ever since by a certain number of Englishmen belonging to the class before referred to, merits severe reprobation. Boastfulness, certainly, is the characteristic of a small nation. England has no need to descend to self-praise. History and geography,

science and literature, testify convincingly to her greatness. Modesty, however, like all other virtues, has its limits. Obloquy, is indeed, as Burke declared, "a necessary ingredient in the composition of all true glory," but a nation's revilers should not be found among its own children. True pride of race is an ennobling sentiment; for the more highly we think of our ancestors, the stronger will be our determination to do nothing that will disgrace them. Personal honour is inseparable from national honour. The world has always had as wholesome a contempt for the renegade as for a **man who** defames or brings dishonour on his family. True patriotism has sufficient dignity to refrain alike from self-glorification and exaggerated displays of humility. The patriot who sincerely believes at any time, that his country is pursuing an unjust course of action prefers, after vainly endeavoring to bring about a change in the direction he desires, to remain silent rather than join the ranks of its traducers.

Commercialism, too, is an influence inimical to patriotism. There are, certainly, commercial patriots who form a fairly numerous class. We are familiar with the intense patriotism of the manufacturer who urges his fellow-citizens, as a patriotic duty, to buy the goods he makes at prices fifty per cent. higher than those that are charged for better goods of the same kind produced by his foreign competitor. This is patriotism a little diluted with business. On the other hand, the interests of the merchant strongly favour in his case the growth of cosmopolitan sympathies. His heart, to some extent at least, is where his treasure is, that is to say, in the country with which he does the most lucrative trade. The painful revelations made by Rear-Admiral Consett in his recent work, *The Triumph of the Unarmed Forces*, seem to show that during the late war many British merchants knowingly furnished the German armies, not only with food, but with the munitions required to kill British soldiers. Similarly more than a century ago French soldiers marched to battle in boots made in English factories. "Business as usual" is a maxim which, in times of national danger, sometimes comes into collision with the fundamental obligations of patriotism. Financiers almost always have international leanings, and sometimes, in providing the sinews of war to secretly hostile countries, in the end bring cruel disasters on their own.

History justifies the view that, as a rule, the patriotic sentiment is far stronger among agricultural than among commercial nations. The explanation is simple. The goods of the merchant, and the money bags of the financier, are portable, and in dangerous crises can be removed to places of safety. The farmer, however, cannot carry away his land on his back. To him foreign conquest

means ruin, so he fights in defence of his possessions to the last. The contrast between the spirit shown by the Romans and the Carthaginians respectively during the Punic Wars serves as a good illustration in this respect.

Of all virtues, perhaps, patriotism in an absolute pure form is the rarest. Often it is based on self-interest. Sometimes it is tainted with vain-glory. The close association between love of country and love of fame is well exemplified in a famous line of which, as a rule, only the first three words are quoted:—

"Vincit amor patriae, laudumque immensa cupido."

That the desire to win public praise is often entirely honourable may freely be admitted. Milton in a noble passage unnecessary to quote commended it with faint censure. But unquestionably the highest triumph of patriotic devotion is that of the man who, without hope of fame or reward, does not hesitate to sacrifice health, comfort and, if need be, life itself solely that his nation may live.

Disinterestedness is the distinctive sign of true patriotism. Becky Sharp, indeed, informed us with much truth that it was easy to be good on £5000 a year. Possibly there are a few gentlemen in Australia who find it equally easy to be patriotic on incomes of only one-fifth of that amount. But the world, as a rule, honours the citizen who serves his country without any pecuniary recompense more highly than the one who receives remuneration in return for his services. Swift drew pungent comparison between the rewards bestowed on the great Duke of Marlborough after his victorious campaigns by the British Parliament and those assigned to the hero of a Roman triumph in ancient times. It is not, of course, for a moment suggested that—say—the civil servant in receipt of a salary from the public funds cannot be a true patriot. That were absurd. Many of the world's greatest men have been the paid servants of the State. But it may be affirmed with confidence that the measure of the patriotism of the civil servant is the degree in which he places his duty to his country above considerations of personal interest. He has an indisputable right to expect fair remuneration for his time and labour. But at the same time the people to whose convenience he ministers are entitled to expect a readiness on his part to share equally in any sacrifices which circumstances may compel them to make. Those employees on the Italian State railways who, at an early stage in the late war, approached the Government with a voluntary offer to surrender for national purposes a considerable proportion of their wages showed as fine a spirit of patriotism as was exhibited by the men who volunteered for the battlefield. Mill, indeed, correctly expressed the utilitarian view

of the question now under examination when, in the second chapter of his *Representative Government*, he laid down that "the ideally perfect constitution of a public office is that in which the interest of the functionary is entirely coincident with his duty." But the really patriotic public servant is he who always places his duty above his interest.

The principle expressed by the well-known saying:—"My country, right or wrong," has been the object of much severe criticism. Moralists have condemned it unsparingly, and perhaps from the purely ethical point of view with justification. But there are cases where individual action should not be governed by the rules of abstract morality. Individual right may mean collective wrong. I have no strict right, for instance, to break into my neighbour's house and lay hands on him; but if my neighbour goes mad, and tries to choke his wife I am justified in smashing his door, if necessary, and putting him by forcible means, under restraint. After all, as the ancient maxim lays down, the supreme law is the safety of the State. If a citizen is convinced that his country is engaged in an unjust war, is it his duty to assist her, oppose her, or stand aloof altogether? Ethically speaking, of course, the man who takes any part in what he conscientiously believes to be a national crime commits a wrong. He becomes in a degree particeps criminis. But on the other hand, were he to look on disapprovingly, his example would tend to weaken his country, and help to bring on it defeat and ruin. Thus, to some extent, he would be guilty of bringing on thousands of his innocent fellow-citizens the direst calamities. The Christian subjects of Rome, we all know, helped considerably by their excessive virtue to overthrow the Empire and plunge it into the horrors of the Gothic conquest; and the Bolshevik disciples of Tolstoy the other day committed a similar wrong against their country. Surely, in any case, there must be a certain amount of arrogance and presumption intermingled with the virtue of the man who condemns and dissociates himself from actions approved of by thousands of his fellow-citizens equal to himself both in intelligence and moral sensibility? Could the conscientious objector, who looked on passively while the enemy who, in his opinion, had been unjustly attacked by his fellow-citizens, ravaged his country, feel that his conduct was right? Might not the idea occur to him that conscience could make traitors as well as cowards? After all, a virtue exercised at the expense of others is not wholly admirable. It would seem, then, that the duty of the citizen who at any time sincerely believes that his country is engaged in an unjust war, after having done everything in his power beforehand, by honourable means, to prevent such action, is to assist in every way towards the

attainment of victory, and after the achievement of that object, towards the mitigation of the terms of peace imposed on the vanquished. If, either actively or passively, he assist the enemy, his conduct is despicable. Even if the parent has sinned it is not for the child, wholly or in part, to assume the office of executioner. We would not esteem very highly the person who looked on without interfering while a stranger, who had attacked an adversary of superior physique, suffered brutal punishment. If the aggressor were his own brother we should think yet worse of him. The conscientious abstainer in time of national danger, then, though perhaps in private life a man of exemplary habits, can hardly be called a good citizen. He lacks the essential virtue of patriotism.

Pre-eminent, or, at all events, most widely celebrated, displays of the quality just mentioned have usually been associated with wars and periods of great national danger. But it were altogether wrong to regard patriotism solely as the child of storms. It flourishes, or should flourish, in times of peace as well as those of strife, and may distinguish the humblest member of the community as well as the statesman or soldier. It is far harder, indeed, to live for one's country than to die for it. All those citizens who perform useful work on the farm, or in the home or factory, injuring none while benefiting the community as well as their own families by their labours, are good patriots. On the other hand, the grasping or tyrannical employer, and the idle or mutinous worker are unworthy of the term. The so-called profiteer who is really a social robber, and the industrial agitator who employs himself in creating class discord, are utterly lacking in patriotism, since by their depredations or incitements they impoverish and weaken the community. Whatever influences tend to cause disunion and bitter feelings among the citizens of a country have also the effect of lessening its power to resist a foreign attack, and those who exercise such influences are enemies within its gates.

Each good Australian citizen cherishes a three-fold patriotism. He loves the fair and spacious land in which he lives, a land not only of hope but now also of glory. He feels at the same time a reverential love for the distant northern islands which were the homes of his forefathers, and for the illustrious nation under whose sheltering wings he so long enjoyed the blessings of peace. And his feelings of warm affection extend also to all the countries inhabited by his kinsmen belonging to the great family of nations known, and we may hope, always to be known as the British Empire. This enlarged patriotism, rooted in common blood, institutions and traditions as well as in community of interest, is the keystone of that majestic Imperial arch which now spans continents and oceans.

The patriotism of some peoples, such as the Spaniards, Greeks, and Portuguese, is in the main passive and retrospective. They live in the twilight of ancestral glory. Australians and Canadians are privileged to cherish, not only pride in the past, but hope for the future. Behind them they have great achievements; before them equally great opportunities. And so long as they and their kinsmen in Great Britain preserve that unifying and stimulating spirit of patriotism which is, in the true sense, "the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprise," respecting other peoples because they also respect themselves, the British Empire will retain its present proud position as first among the ruling nations of the world.

NOTES BY THE WAY.

No. 2.

The Two Realms.

On the one hand we have the world of Martha, the world of politics or common affairs, a world of public spirit and efficiency, of organisation and standardisation, always tending to a larger and larger scale, and now becoming increasingly international. On the other hand we have the realm of Mary, the world of the individual human soul, a world personal and intimate, intense in its feelings and attachments, and capable of inspiring by the all-pervading and integrating passion, alike unreasonable and unfathomable, which we call love.

If men realised the difference between these two realms and between the motives and impulses which operate within them, half the political problems of the world would be quickly solved. For the greater part of these so-called "problems," including those which seem most hopeless and untractable, arises simply from an overlapping of the two realms and from a failure on each side to realise that the two parties are dwelling on different planes and speaking different languages.

—Alfred E. Zimmern, in the *Century Magazine*.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE WORLD.

By T. A. Hunter, M.A., M.Sc., Professor of Philosophy, Victoria University College, Wellington, N.Z.

FOR the student of social philosophy the condition of the world to-day raises many problems and suggests many remedies. There are some who believe that the difficulties of the world are merely economic; that a change in our methods of production or distribution, or an alteration in our customs-tariff, is all that is needed to start the world again on the way of progress. Others hold that the supply of great men has fallen off and that consequently the world to-day lacks leadership. McDougall in *National Welfare and National Decay* insists that there has been "a deterioration of the innate qualities of the population," that the leaders are naturally drawn from the upper social strata which, as compared with the lower, "contain a larger proportion of persons of superior natural endowments." Many changes have produced a steadily diminishing birth-rate among the people of those upper strata, and at the same time the lower strata have produced their kind numerous enough, owing to the maintenance of their fecundity and to the improved systems of sanitation and medical aid. Thus, relatively, the supply of leaders has been diminished; at the same time the increase in the complexity of social life has made greater, and even greater, demands upon the foresight, determination and intellect of the people. Thus the structure of modern civilisation has been weakened in two ways: by a decrease in the number of natural leaders and by an increased demand for leadership. Therefore the world is in its "parlous condition." "Our civilisation, by reason of its increasing complexity, is making constantly increasing demands upon the qualities of its bearers; the qualities of these bearers are diminishing or deteriorating, rather than improving."

No one, perhaps, will challenge McDougall's statement of the general tendency of our times, but when this author tries to make the whole issue depend on heredity we may well pause. May it not be that social deterioration is moral rather than intellectual, that it is not so much a falling off of the innate qualities of the individuals of the race as a perversion of their ideas of the purpose and aim of existence? May it not be that the source of the evil is to be found not in the science but in the philosophy of the twentieth century?

McDougall's views have been adapted for the popular mind by Stoddard in his *Revolt Against Civilisation*, or as the sub-title informs us, *The Menace of the Under-man*. Civilisation is weakening because of the sterility of the classes, the fecundity of the masses, and the influence of the social ladder whereby the promising material

of the masses finds its way into the classes. The hope of the world, therefore, is in Eugenics. This book shows clearly the cloven hoof of journalism and is more remarkable for its appeal to emotion and prejudice than for its logic; indeed the second half of the book is largely a refutation of the first. There is a very frequent use of abusive epithets, those who differ from the author being described as "inferior," "regressive," "bolshewic," "degenerate," "destructive," "tainted geniuses," etc., etc. But details apart, Stoddart's thesis rests on two foundations, neither of which is very firm. They are:—

1. That civilisation draws to its leadership the best of the community and that this can be shown by statistical investigation. Great reliance is placed upon the results of the testing of intelligence in the American army;

2. That our civilisation is essential to the development of humanity. It would be very difficult to establish either of these claims. No one will deny that among the leaders of western civilisation are to be found men of the highest character and attainment. But are they all such? Do we not find among Stoddart's "inferior people," men of sounder views and higher ideals than those common to the men who lead? Is it not true that, while our stage of civilisation has drawn some good men to its councils, it has rejected more, and has thrown to the top a good deal of inferior material, if not inferior in intelligence, certainly baser in character? It is not only cream that rises to the top; in our day the very meaning of the word "politician" is significant. It is of course hard for the ordinary man to realise that it is possible that our type of civilisation may have played its part, but the scientist must not hide this possibility from himself. We may be standing at the parting of the ways. Either we must give up our ideas of man's nature and existence, our conceptions of life and society, or we shall find ourselves displaced by those who, whatever their material achievements, have a truer conception of personality and the aim of life. What is our civilisation? Is it a condition that must be maintained at all costs? Might not the same have been urged of savagery and barbarism at their height? Is not civilisation but a stage in the evolution of mankind and may it not be that, far from maintaining it, we may be called upon to slough off this skin and begin a new structure? Lester Ward has pointed out the fact that the development of society is sympodial; the bearers of progress carry the work only to a certain point, at which the appearance of new forces gives another direction to evolution. May we not stand at one of these points of departure? If we do not realise this can we take any effective part in designing the new construction?

The great systems of forces in the world are physical, biotic,

and psychic. During the past century man's insight into the operation of these forces has become increasingly keen and, more especially in the physical and biotic realms, man's knowledge and control have reached a very high measure of efficiency. But apparently our knowledge of these forces has outrun our moral development; we have not produced characters of such a moral quality that we can be entrusted with the direction of the powerful physical machines that man's cunning has enabled him to design. Mere knowledge, however accurate and profound, is after all only an instrument and like all instruments may be used for good or evil. The problem of the human race at the present juncture is not so much one of fact as one of value. It is not that we lack knowledge and power; it is rather that we have lost our measuring-rod of value and fail to direct our knowledge and power along paths that lead to social welfare. The world-war was but an indication of this fact—the growth of power divorced from moral insight and moral control. During those awful years power was not lacking, all the brains of the human race, all the accumulated knowledge of the past, were organised with an efficiency hitherto undreamt of. But for what purpose—destruction. Moral development had lagged behind intellectual and practical achievement, with the result that the forces were directed against the interests of the discoverers of them. It was human suicide on the grand scale. There can be no doubt that the war made manifest to many that human power was not being used to human advantage, that the physical machines had got out of control, and that man was suffering very largely because he had unchained forces that he was unable to direct to social ends. Indeed it might also be said that, so blind is man, the war was necessary to direct attention to the more potent psychic or mental forces on which the direction of man's immense mechanical machine depends.

But it is not only in war that this contrast manifests itself. Every aspect of social life to-day presents features that suggest that man's knowledge has outrun his moral direction; if we cannot develop both simultaneously we must mark time in the field of discovery until the moral forces have caught up.

Turn, for example, to industry. Economists and moral reformers are at one in saying that machine-production has not brought about that amelioration of life that was so confidently anticipated one hundred years ago. There is power enough, but it lacks direction, with the result that "our present system of industry resulting as it does in its mountains of wealth on the one hand and its Saharas of destitution on the other has many horrible aspects." Moral control has disappeared; there is a blind struggle for the material product, a struggle that wastes the product and destroys the

character. Unemployment and the spectre of unemployment, strike fear into the bravest hearts and weaken independence of character; long hours at the machine produce a fatigue and an inertia that send the workmen hot-haste to all sorts of undesirable excitements. Surely if we had a truer conception of the nature of existence and the aim of life we would direct these energies along other lines. Rabindranath Tagore sums the matter up in his clear and terse manner when he says that man may use the machine without injury to himself. What damns his soul is to allow the machine to use him. Yet this is precisely what modern society is doing; it is concentrating its energies and attention on the material products, which are after all only means to the good life and it is losing interest in the good life altogether. The modern industrial problem, capital versus labour, as it is called, cannot be solved merely by the elimination of one of the terms; no solution is possible so long as we envisage the problem as one of matter, as economic in the narrow sense of that term. The problem is one of human personality, and as Green long ago pointed out, the solution depends on our seeking an end in which all may participate, in not aiming at a material product of which one gains only what another loses, but at those higher ends in which the good of each is the good of all.

This change in attitude of mind and direction of social forces would enable us to deal with another of those social problems that are of so much interest to Australasia—the problem of population. There can be little doubt that under present social and international conditions our vacant territories are sure signs of the coming storm. At the same time man's knowledge of the facts of generation are so complete that among ever-widening circles birth-control is becoming common. Much could be said for birth-control among a people of wisdom and moral development. Then the factors that would determine the direction of the life-force would be the progress and welfare of the race. But no one could suggest that our knowledge is directed to these ends to-day. Birth-control is now governed almost wholly by economic and selfish motives. All investigators find that the control is most rigidly exercised by those whose progeny would be of most service to the world and least by those whose children are a liability and not an asset of the social group. We have discovered the secret of nature before we have reached the stage of moral development that would ensure that we used it wisely. If we look at one aspect of this wide subject—the fertility of the unfit and the means of avoiding the evil consequences thereof—we find exactly the same difficulty. It has been suggested that degenerates should be sterilised so that society will not be called upon to carry the burden that their fertility brings. There can be little

doubt that we have reached the stage at which we realise the consequences of the fertility of the unfit and understand the methods by which this increase may be prevented. In New Zealand at the present time a Board is reporting on the whole question. But have we developed a people to whom this tremendous power of sterilisation can be safely entrusted? Personally I think not. Could we be reasonably certain that this power would be used solely for the benefit of society? Could we be sure that those who would exercise this power would allow no unworthy motive, no personal end, no consideration of wealth, family or nationality to influence them on the one hand or the other? Moral reformers, if they reflect, will be the first to realise that their experience in other realms has shown that at the present stage of development men cannot be trusted with this great power. Indeed there are many signs in the exercise of less important functions that men are not worthy of being trusted with the great authority that our very complex civilisation calls for. Are the powers that are exercised by the teacher, the medical man, the lawyer, the politician, directed to the attainment of public welfare? Modern psychology and modern ethics agree in their exposure of the moral weakness of modern society. We have lost interest in the purpose of life; we no longer quarrel on questions of morals or principles; we no longer struggle for ideals. We have changed the significance of the old question: What is his worth? What kind of man is he? We now ask: What is he worth? What material goods does he possess? We seldom ever think of raising the question whether the wealth was obtained by fair means or by foul. We might be described as a society in which it is true "that the smell of all cash is good."

Again the knowledge and practice of this new spirit would enable us to unlock the door that leads to sympathetic relations between our race and those great peoples whom we have dominated—the Hindus and Egyptians. We may pride ourselves, and in a measure rightly, on what we have done for these peoples. But what we have done is expressed mainly in material goods, and even then, perhaps, the credit balance is not as large as we imagine. But this apart, we ought to try to understand the "complex" of these peoples. Rabindranath Tagore helps us to realise the Hindu point of view when he says:—"The wriggling tentacles of a cold-blooded utilitarianism, with which the West has grasped all the easily yielding succulent portions of the East are causing pain and indignation throughout the Eastern countries. The West comes to us, not with the imagination and sympathy that unite, but with a shock of passion—passion for power and wealth. This passion is a mere force, which has in it the principle of separation, of conflict."

Yet the poet-philosopher of India realises and acknowledges the great advances made by western science and the important bearings these must have on Eastern life and thought. But again the question is, What will the West do with it? Will it respect the old and sacred traditions of the Ganges, or will it desecrate the river by handing over its banks to the manufacture of gunny-bags? "The world to-day is offered to the West. She will destroy it if she does not use it for a great creation of man. The materials for such a creation are in the hands of science, but the creative genius is in man's spiritual ideal."

In his essay on *The Spirit of Freedom*, the same author exposes the sham in much of the so-called freedom of both East and West. "The civilisation of the West has in it the spirit of the machine which must move; and to that blind movement human lives are offered as fuel, keeping up the steam-power. It represents the active aspect of inertia which has the appearance of freedom but not its truth, and therefore gives rise to a slavery both within its boundaries and outside. The present civilisation of India has the constraining power of the mould. It squeezes living man in the grip of rigid regulations, and its repression of individual freedom makes it only too easy for men to be forced into submission of all kinds and degrees. In both of these traditions life is offered up to something that is not life; it is a sacrifice, which has no God for its worship, and is therefore utterly in vain. The West is continually producing power in excess of its spiritual control, and India has produced a system of mechanical control in excess of its vitality."

This loss of moral insight, this deterioration in moral fibre, and not the loss of innate qualities, is the real indication of decadence. Doubtless our methods of life have changed somewhat our physical and mental capacities, but it can hardly be held that all these changes have been for the worse. But there are signs, sure signs, that development of our moral standards have not kept pace with the increase in our knowledge of fact; our weakness arises not from our lack of knowledge but from our failure to realise the purpose of existence and to direct the forces we have discovered along right lines.

"Democracy is still upon its trial," says James, in one of his essays. "The civic genius of our people is its only bulwark, and neither laws nor monuments, neither battleships nor public libraries, nor great newspapers, nor booming stocks; neither mechanical invention nor political adroitness, nor churches, nor universities, nor civil service examinations can save us from degeneration if the inner mystery be lost." That inner mystery is our philosophy, our view of life, what we at heart wish to achieve.

The splendid conquests of physical science, the increasing power of man to control these tremendous forces, have blinded mankind to the fact that these are not ends but merely means to ends, and that unless the ends are worthy, our increasing power is but a more certain and speedy means of destruction. The army of material advance must mark time while the army of moral development comes into line.

The Renaissance and Reformation, that mark the beginning of modern thought are names applied to a period in which man, the individual, discovered himself. No longer was he to be considered merely as a member of church, guild, or corporation, his personality merged in the mass; he was to take a personal part in the great adventure of life. The individualism of that time hastened man's development up to a point, but it had within it the seeds of its own destruction that ran to wild oats in the period of the Industrial Revolution—the evil effects of which still persist. But to-day, in this great crisis of his history, man bids fair to discover himself as a social being, one whose development, as well as his interest, depends on the co-operation of his fellows. The knowledge and practice of this truth seems to provide the only solution of the world problems of to-day.

NOTES BY THE WAY.

No. 3.

The Economic Motive.

I know of no greater accusation against capitalism than what you find when you go into some woollen factory or cotton mill and see a magnificent invention, intended to wear or to last, but deliberately and knowingly employed to produce rubbish made to wear out. What is the present incentive? Profiteering is the present incentive. My view is that that incentive is damned. We have got to put in its place the incentive of social service. Can that incentive win through? It is winning through. Even in our society of to-day, evil as it is, there are men and women who disdain profiteering. I believe that as time goes on these men and women and the ideals for which they stand will triumph. That is the great spirit which is going to reorganise your industries, that is going to inspire your workers in the future and make you a new nation.

Leo Chiozza Money.

ON CASSIRER'S "SUBSTANCE AND FUNCTION." A NEW LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD.

By H. J. PRIESTLEY, M.A., Professor of Mathematics in the
University of Queensland.

One characteristic of modern mathematics is its definition of the objects with which it deals by means of the relations existing between them. They are no longer defined as self-existent isolated entities and then brought into mutual relationship by arbitrarily assumed postulates; but relations are postulated and these relations define by implication the conceptual entities involved. In Pure Mathematics, then, we have a system of logic which differs from the traditional Formal Logic in that it gives the *relation-concept* supremacy over the *thing-concept*.

The idea of magnitude which essentially attaches to "things" is subordinated to the idea of order; a totality, such as the system of real numbers, is not a collection of individuals, but an ordered manifold, defined by the laws governing its formation; the idea of constancy gives place to the idea of invariance of relations under stated transformations.

Prompted by these tendencies in modern mathematical thought Professor Ernest Cassirer published in 1910, under the title "Substanz begriff und Funktions begriff," the results of an investigation of the general Theory of Knowledge, carried out from the standpoint of the *relation-concept*. This work was supplemented by another, entitled, "Zur Einstein'schen Relativitaets-theorie" in 1921. A translation of the two has recently been published by the Open Court Publishing Company under the title, "Substance and Function and Einstein's Theory of Relativity."

Professor Cassirer begins with a critical discussion of the Aristotelian generic-concept and the theory of abstraction, and finds that all criticisms, whether directed from the logical or psychological standpoint, tend to the same conclusion; namely, that the shortcomings of the traditional theory arise from the subordination of the idea of *relation* to the idea of *thing*. It is advisable, therefore, to remodel logical theory on the basis of a revised view of the concept.

The general tendency of this revision may be indicated by two quotations:—

"It is evident that the characteristic feature of the concept is not the universality of a presentation, but the universal validity of a principle of serial order. We do not isolate any abstract part whatever from the manifold before us, but we create for its members a definite relation by thinking of them as bound together by an inclusive law."

"In opposition to the logic of the generic concept, which represents the point of view and influence of the concept of *substance*, there now appears the logic of the mathematical concept of *function*.

A model for a formal logic based on these ideas is found in mathematics; but when questions of experience arise it is necessary to look further afield. Cassirer finds the required model in the exact sciences, particularly Physics. Accordingly the first part of his book is concerned with an historical and critical discussion of the function of the concept in Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry.

This discussion opens with an examination of Mill's attempt to establish the concept of number on an empirical basis, and Frege's criticism thereof. This examination brings out the impossibility of founding a satisfactory theory on a correlation between number and physical objects. A psychological discussion shews that attempts to base a theory on correlation with mental presentations are equally unsatisfactory. The full significance of the concept of number appears when Dedekind rejects the correlation of numbers with objects, whether physical or mental, and bases his theory on the idea of a rule putting each individual number in its place in an ordered totality. The numbers then appear as "a system of ideal objects whose whole content is exhausted in their mutual relations." It appears then that the fundamental idea underlying the concept of number is the idea not of thing but of relation. By gradual unfolding of this relation the number system is developed from the positive integers to the fractions, negative numbers, irrationals and finally to the transfinite numbers. The new forms are not added to the existing system from without but are developed from within by means of the fundamental generating relation.

Further light is thrown on the scientific construction of concepts when we pass from the concept of number to the concept of space. Here, again, we see a shifting of emphasis from things to relations.

The ancient Geometry was concerned with the properties of individual geometrical forms. Descartes' introduction of Analytical Geometry focuses attention on relations. The position of a point in a plane is specified by two coordinates giving its distances from two fixed axes, and a curve is defined by means of a functional relation between these coordinates. Thus the curve and its properties are replaced by a manifold given by a rule defining a serial order: the thing-concept gives place to the relation-concept.

Descartes' method involved a departure from geometrical intuition and a return was inevitable. In this return, however, the idea of relation was carried over. Projective Geometry is concerned with relations between geometrical forms rather than with properties of individual curves. Its fundamental position is shown by Steiner who writes: "Neither the synthetic nor analytic method constitutes the essence of the matter, which consists in the discovery of the dependency of forms on each other."

Von Standt, Cayley and Klein, have founded the theory of measurement on ideas of order and thus metrical geometry is based on relations. Finally the Theory of Groups with its doctrine of invariance provides a criterion of permanence which is independent of the idea of

thing. "Permanence is not related to the duration of things and their properties, but signifies the relative independence of certain members of a functional connection, which prove in comparison with others to be independent moments."

The self-contained ideal system of mathematics is insufficient to throw full light on the logical significance of the concept. As Cassirer says: "The decision as to the direction of logic cannot be gained by a type of consideration which remains one-sidedly in the ideal. Rather it is the genuine concepts of being, the assertions concerning things and their real properties, which must constitute the true standard. The question as to the meaning and function of the concept gains its final and definitive formulation only in the concepts of nature." At first sight Physics seems to support traditional Logic. The significance of the concept appears to depend on the existence of a correlative thing in the world of nature. A closer investigation, however, reveals something more than "a collection of observations strung together as if on a thread." At the very threshold of Physics we pass from mere observation into the realm of pure conceptual construction. Motion in the accurate scientific sense is not the product of pure observation. It is nothing but a certain relation into which Space and Time enter, not in their psychological and phenomenal properties, but in their conceptual mathematical meaning. Again, the moving body is not a direct datum of sense perception, but an ideal limiting structure conceptually substituted. The first step, then, in the formation of fundamental scientific concepts is the introduction of ideal limits in place of the members of the sensuous manifold. Scientific description is no mere passive reproduction of the world of sense, but an active process transporting the data of the senses to a new logical sphere. "The aggregate of sensuous things must be related to a system of necessary concepts and laws, and brought to unity in this relation. This process of thought, however, demands really more than the mere combination and transformation of parts and presentations; it presupposes an independent and constructive activity as is most clearly manifest in the creation of limiting structures."

It is not, however, a sufficient description of the relation between fact and theory in Physics merely to assert that physical theory expresses the laws which hold for the limiting concepts. The connection is much more complex, as Professor Cassirer brings out by an excellent survey of the history of physical method from Plato onwards. In the metaphor of the cave Plato contrasts two ideals of knowledge, the one purely empirical, the other teleological. In his later work he emphasises, as a necessary first step in the passage from one to the other, the reduction of mere sense perception to definite measurement. In Aristotle this work recedes to the background and pure teleology becomes the conceptual foundation of physics. Kepler, Galileo, and Newton return to the Platonic position, but, in the reaction against the ontological hypotheses of the schoolmen, their followers over emphasize the demand for a physics without hypotheses, ignoring the logical

hypotheses underlying the Principia. Mayer shows the way to the true viewpoint when he states that a fact is explained if it is known on all sides. Knowledge of a fact in this sense means adding it to existing knowledge and shewing its relation to its cognate facts. This involves numerical expression of the results of measurement; and the logical presuppositions which lie at the basis of measurement form the real hypotheses of science. "The true hypothesis signifies nothing but a principle and means of measurement. It is not introduced after the phenomena are already known and ordered as magnitudes, but it serves to make possible this very order. It points the way by which we advance from the sensuous manifold of sensations to the intellectual manifold of measure and number." The hypothetical element in measurement destroys the view that we reach physical laws by comparing and measuring individual facts. "The law can only arise from measurement because we have assumed the law in hypothetical form in measurement itself." The verification of the law consists in shewing that "the totality of experiences are connected into an unbroken unity on the basis of the assumption." Thus, "the validity of the physical concept does not rest upon its content of real elements of existence but upon the strictness of connection which it makes possible. In this fundamental character it constitutes the extension and continuation of the mathematical concept."

The physical specification of an object consists in giving definite numerical values for its density, specific heat, etc. In this way it is compared with and placed in serial orders among other objects with respect to different aspects which have been previously conceived. "The physical analysis of the object into the totality of its numerical constants is thus in no sense the same as the breaking up of a sensuous thing into the group of its sensuous properties. The sensuous quality of a thing becomes a physical object when it is transformed into a serial determination. The *thing* now changes from a sum of properties into a mathematical system of values which are established with reference to some scale of comparison. *Each of the different physical concepts defines such a scale*, and thereby renders possible an increasingly intimate connection and arrangement of the elements of the given."

It is not possible within the limits of this article to consider the interesting discussions of the atom, the ether, energy, the chemical concepts and the foundations of mechanics by which Professor Cassirer marshals his evidence in support of the conclusions outlined above. We shall proceed, therefore, to indicate his application of his view of the concept to general logical problems. A carefully reasoned chapter on the Problem of Induction leads to the conclusion that the function of induction is to formulate a succession of ordered series. By means of the various physical concepts the data of experience are arranged in various serial orders. Each of these orders is then taken as a unit and these new units are again arranged in mutual relationship. The process is continually repeated, and the end, always approached but

never attained, is a general universal law uniting all the phenomena. The task is carried out by formulating hypotheses and testing by experiment, the test of validity being the power to bring the facts of experience into mutual relationship. When an extension of experience involves a breakdown of the existing scheme unity is restored; if possible, by modifying the earlier serial orders of the set; and the broader covering orders are left unchanged unless such modifications are ineffectual. Whatever changes are made in the scheme must of necessity leave a certain body of principles unaltered; for all modifications are made in order to bring new material into harmony with the existing scheme without destroying its essential unity. This fact leads to the idea of "universal elements of form that persist through all change in the particular material content of experience." It is the task of critical analysis to attempt to isolate these ultimate common elements of all possible forms of scientific experience. On this idea of the invariance of forms Cassirer bases his doctrine of reality. In the progressive development of the inductive process certain forms persist and constitute the "objective," in contradistinction to the "subjective" which arises from the passing forms. It is clear that on this view objective and subjective are purely relative terms, as forms which persist throughout a period of development may vanish at a later stage of the productive process. The significance of this view of objectivity might be emphasized by a quotation: "To know a content means to make it an object by raising it out of the mere status of givenness and granting it a certain logical constancy and necessity. Thus we do not know objects as if they were already independently determined and given as objects; but we know objectively, by producing certain limitations and by fixating certain permanent elements and connections within the uniform flow of experience. The concept of the object in this sense constitutes no ultimate limit of knowledge, but is rather the fundamental instrument by which all that has become its permanent possession is expressed and established. The object marks the logical possession of knowledge and not a dark beyond forever removed from knowledge."

At first sight Cassirer's theory of objectivity seems to do no more than shift the old controversy between realist and idealist to another ground. Are the permanent relations which constitute the object mere constructions, or do they correspond to some external reality? The discussion of this question occupies a chapter of his book. It follows from the general standpoint of the earlier chapters that the question in its metaphysical form has no meaning. The true question is "What are the forms of judgment and relating thought in which we can present to ourselves temporally, in actual empirical experience, the pure timeless validity of the ideal principles." In place of the old object, the thing, passively received in sense impression, Cassirer finds the relation object actively apprehended in definite acts of judgment. The object arises as a constant relation which we never actually attain but which we approach as the limit of a series of interpretations

of experience. The corresponding subjective apprehension of the object consists in the appreciation of this limit through the successive acts of judgment involved in building up the series. This solution naturally leads to an enquiry into the psychology of relations with which the first book ends.

The discussion of the Theory of Relativity supports the conclusions of the earlier work, and contains an interesting survey of the gradual emancipation of Physics from the dominance of the idea of substance. In the work of Einstein and his followers Cassirer sees the culmination of the movement from substance to relations. The final chapter on Relativity and the Problem of Reality contains a warning against the all too frequent error of seeing in natural science the only road to the knowledge of reality.

Professor Cassirer's work follows to their logical conclusion the ideas of those early scientists who first passed from the crude data of sense to the more refined scientific objects. As the refinement proceeds it is more and more evident that the object is characterised by the relations into which it enters, and eventually it becomes inevitable to focus attention on the relation rather than on the thing. The demand for some guarantee of stability tends to delay this transition. An examination of modern scientific theory, however, shews that this demand is far from being decisively in favour of things rather than relations. On the one side the guarantee is found in the atom, the electron and the aether; on the other in the assumption that as theory develops in agreement with experience a body of fundamental relations will remain unchanged. A belief in an ordered universe is implicit in all scientific thinking. Cassirer's view of scientific development as a continual approach to the fundamental relations constituting that order is entirely reasonable. Concentration on the primary importance of relations and deduction of the properties of things by considering them as related involves less assumption and less risk of the hypostatization of concepts than the converse process of regarding things as the primary elements.

Cassirer's book should be read by all interested in scientific method—and the philosophical questions arising in connection therewith. In addition to the excellent exposition of the author's own views it contains many valuable historical and critical discussions of the positions adopted by previous thinkers.

The translators, W. C. and E. C. Swabey, are to be congratulated on the manner in which they have carried out their work.

FROM THE EDITOR'S CHAIR.

IN an article in a previous number of the Journal (Vol. 1. p. 161) the statement was made that except for incidental treatment by Professors of Economics or History, Sociology was the most neglected subject in our Australian Universities. A partial qualification of this judgment must be made in favour of Melbourne University. Short courses of Lectures on Sociology have been given in past years at the University of Sydney as part of the ordinary teaching in the Department of Philosophy, but we now owe it to Melbourne University that the claim of Sociology as an independent subject has at last been officially recognised.

At the beginning of last year, Professor J. Alexander Gunn, M.A., B.Sc. (Econ.), Ph.D., formerly Fellow and Lecturer at the University of Liverpool, and author of several important philosophical works, was appointed independent Lecturer on Sociology and Director of Extra-Mural Work. Melbourne University has thus removed the reproach that "in our Australasian schools of learning no provision is made for the systematic study of society, a study which promises to become *the science of the Twentieth Century.*" The task of educating the governing bodies of Universities is probably not harder in Australia than it is elsewhere, but after many years' advocacy of the claims of Sociology for University recognition it is distressing to find the old ignorance of what Sociology really is as stubborn and unabashed as ever*. The subject is often regarded as if it were a minor branch of Economics, to be dealt with by the Professor of Economics in his spare hours. To this the obvious reply is that Sociology, far from being a sub-department of Economics, is really a "central science," by means of which historical, legal, economic, political studies may be correlated. As Professor Gunn says, Sociology can never be even "equated with Economics. Future development of these subjects may be such that economics will be studied in relation to the larger study of society as a whole. For the sociologist economic activity is an important phase of social life, but however important, it is only *one aspect*. Sociology must comprehend and display all aspects. For this reason it is pre-eminently a subject which no modern University can afford to neglect. Society has sought to understand much, but it has too long neglected one important sphere of study, namely, itself."

In his Inaugural Lecture, (*Social Progress*. Melbourne University Press, 1923) Professor Gunn advocates the establishment of a school of Social Science. "We need a definite department of Social and Political Science, granting its own Honour degree in Arts." At present, Sociology may be taken as a pass subject in the Melbourne Arts course, and as one of a group in the School of History or the School

*Psychology has suffered in its time from similar ignorance. A member of the Senate of an Australian University said recently that students who wanted to study Psychology must be "mentally unstable."

of Philosophy. During 1923, 67 pass students, and about 30 honours students took Sociology as an examination subject. This is encouraging for the future of the study, and Professor Gunn has already extended the teaching of Sociology so as to cover two years for Honours students. He insists further (*Social Progress*, p. 15), that "our interest ought not to be confined merely to theoretical aspects of social life and to the giving of lectures and holding of tutorial groups for discussions. We need, in this, as in other subjects, opportunities for *research* of a practical kind. In the world of to-day a subject can only advance if it be supplemented by careful and thorough research." For this purpose he recommends the establishment of a hostel as a "camp and laboratory for research work. Important investigations into social conditions might be carried out from such a centre. Problems of housing, poverty, unemployment, child welfare, mental deficiency, imprisonment, recreation, immigration, penal treatment, might be studied at first hand, in touch with the realities of life and in co-operation with societies and departments which interest themselves in these problems. A University Settlement is an essential instrument if the University is to take seriously, as it must very soon do, its study of Sociology, or Social Science." The successful establishment of such a Settlement would, he concludes, "save our University from the stigma of continuing to be regarded as a technical training college merely, preparing for professions, lucrative or otherwise. It would promote intelligent and informed citizenship and social service among the rising generation, a much desired end, and would in addition, relate both the University and the community in a manner beneficial to both. However necessary it is to prepare young persons for their special vocations in life we should always remember that a merely technical training, while it may give us more efficient accountants, draughtsmen, engineers, chemists and lawyers, will never by itself provide the life of combined culture and citizenship which a modern democracy requires, and which a University should always provide." These are brave and wise words, to which we hope due heed will be given, especially by those who are responsible for the control and extension of University teaching in Australia and New Zealand.

Readers of the Journal may be interested in the following syllabus, which represents the course of study in Sociology as at present arranged in the University of Melbourne.

SOCIOLOGY. (A) PASS. Two lectures per week throughout the academic year.

1. **AIM AND SCOPE OF SOCIOLOGY.** Methods of study. Relation to history, philosophy, economics, psychology, anthropology, biology.

2. **TYPES OF SOCIAL GROUPINGS** throughout human history Primitive societies to modern industrial nation-states.

3. **STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS.** (a) The family and marriage Position of women. Sex problems. Social evils. Prostitution. Divorce. (b) The Trade Union; its development and functions. The

economic life of our time. Property and problems of ownership and distribution. (c) The Church. Religion in the social order. (d) The State; its functions and limits. (e) The Nation. Principle of nationality. (f) The League of Nations.

4. MODERN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS. Socialism together with Syndicalism, Collectivism, Guild Socialism, Communism. Nationalism and Imperialism. Class-conflicts. Race-conflict. Internationalism.

5. BIOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY. (Professor Agar). Ten lectures.

SOCIOLOGY. (B) HONOURS. One Lecture and one Tutorial Discussion Group per week. (Professor Gunn, assisted by Mr. P. D. Phillips, M.A., L.L.B., University Tutor in Sociology).

1. THE STATE. Political Theory of the State. Its position today.

2. SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN THOUGHT. Comte and his successors. The development of sociological thought.

3. THEORIES OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. (a) Darwin and Evolutionary Theory. Marx and the Economic Factor.

4. SOCIAL PROGRESS. Its meaning and possibility.

It is said of democracy that it loves quacks and distrusts experts. The untrained mind cannot readily understand what is meant by *science* as applied to either mind or society, and at the present moment Psychology and Sociology are the fields most in favour with quacks, and found most profitable. It is largely through the Universities and the training there provided, that a body of cultured opinion is gradually formed through which the efforts of fools, faddists, and fanatics are kept from endangering the mental and moral sanity of the great gullible public. The politician is rarely an expert in any department, but he is not as a rule a quack. The main defect of the average politician is not either dishonesty or stupidity, but the tendency to prefer immediate and showy success to permanent public benefit. For that defect the study of Sociology provides no certain cure. But if knowledge is not in itself wisdom, it is at any rate through knowledge that a man is enabled to take these long views and broad views, free from passion and prejudice, which are necessary if wisdom is to guide life aright. Goodness like patriotism, is not enough. The good man is not always the wise man, and we have been told that half the work of wise men consists in remedying the mistakes of good men, and nowhere are good men without knowledge more dangerous than in the complexities of social life and the complications of politics. This is not to say that the sociologist must be a cold-blooded analyst, without ideals, without passions, without compassions. If Sociology must needs be a positive science, the sociologist cannot help having a philosophy, a *Weltanschauung*, and a *Lebensanschauung*. The sociologist, like the man in the street, presumably means something when he speaks of *Progress*, and he cannot express his meaning without revealing something of this philosophy of life and the world. Professor Gunn has some excellent things to say of Progress, even after Dean Inge and Professor Bury

have spoken. "We need stern warning. There are signs in many quarters that humanity, setting its heart on materialistic and egoistic conceptions, may go down in ruin quarrelling and fighting about these things. There is no power or so-called natural law, keeping humanity infallibly right and in the line of progress. All is change but not all changes are advance. Change is only a sign of life; it may be moving to fuller life, or may be going to decline . . . Progress can only come because and when humanity recognises itself as collectively responsible for its own history, and when each individual feels his own responsibility regarding that action. We must *will* progress, and consciously set ourselves to realise it. Social progress is idle talk, apart from social purpose, and that purpose must be, until humanity fades from the earth with the decline of all life on our planet, the promotion of the good life realised by intelligent, self-conscious and self controlled beings in a community of 'ends' or persons." (*Social Progress*, p. 19). Progress is not change, as the foolish man thinks. "Be not deceived, to live is not merely to change, but to triumph over change, to set up some values as of absolute worth, and to aim at realising and furthering these. We must ask ourselves what things in life we believe are worth while. On this scheme of values a man must base his religion of his philosophy of life. It is indeed the function of a genuine, living religion, and of a practical social philosophy to provide society with this most necessary of all things—a sense of values relative and absolute. With these we can construct our ideal. Whether it be called by us and others an ideal City or Commonwealth, a *Civitas Dei*, or a Kingdom of God, it is all the same. Progress is not simply a sensible amelioration of life, a growth of comfort; it is also the achievement of a better intellectual formulation of life. To progress is to attain a more complete consciousness of oneself and the world. This is true of the individual or person. Social progress must involve a coming to consciousness of mankind as a whole, a strengthening of human solidarity, a collective co-operation for the fullest expression of personalities in their search after goodness, truth, beauty and fellowship." (*Social Progress*, p. 17).

In the noble and generous rivalry which exists between Australian Universities, the University of Melbourne has now shown the way to her sister institutions, by establishing what we hope will become soon a great School of Social Science, whose beneficent influence will not be confined to Victoria, but will radiate throughout all Australasia.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE BASIS OF FREEDOM, A STUDY OF KANT'S THEORY. By E. Morris Miller, M.A., Litt.D., being Monograph No. 3 of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy. 1923. Pp. 84. Price 3/-.

Professor James Ward begins his recent *Study of Kant* by saying that "On a broad survey of the history of Modern Philosophy it may safely be said that the lonely philosopher of Königsberg occupies the central place." Even the adherents of the Hegelian Idealism would admit this. And although Hegelism is still a force, it has been characterised by Bertrand Russell as, on the whole, a decaying force. The complete ascendancy of Hegelian philosophy was indeed short-lived. As Professor Ward (*op. cit.*) says: "Some fifty years after his [Kant's] death the cry went forth: We must go back to Kant. The so-called Neo-Kantian movement which then began, has increased steadily and continuously ever since. No philosophers, not even Plato or Aristotle, can claim such a volume of literature, expository, philological, and polemical, as that which relates to Kant . . . and what was said some fifty years ago—"Articles about Kant are springing up like mushrooms on every side"—is still true to-day." It is thus interesting that the Third Monograph of The Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy should be a study of Kant's "Basis of Freedom." "Freedom," says Dr. Miller, "may be said to be Kant's greatest idea" (p. 13). The Monograph is both expository and critical. The exposition shews a deep insight into the main motives of Kant's whole system of philosophy. The criticism is constructive, and is characterised by an attempt to soften down Kant's sharp dualism between the supersensible world of freedom and the world of necessity which is the realm of science. The author adds to the text various notes and important appendices; also a brief Kantian bibliography which will direct those interested in Kant to some of the most valuable books on his thought.

—B. Muscio.

PRIMITIVE MENTALITY. By Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (authorised translation by Lilian A. Clare). George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, and The Macmillan Coy. New York.

Science shows its earlier connection with religion and mysticism in many ways. One is the prevailing tendency to divide all people into two classes, the sheep and the goats. In Psychology especially this dichotomous division is very common. Within the last decade or two every psychologist has been called on to decide whether he will be a functionalist or a structuralist, a behaviourist or an introspectionist, a believer in mechanism or in teleology. The battle between the contending parties wages fiercely for a time and then dies away leaving nought but the dust of battle. But while the struggle is on each side detects heresy in any concession to its opponents. To the onlooker the question immediately suggests itself: Must a psychologist decide between behaviour and introspection as if they were mutually exclus-

ive methods or standpoints? The answer is given in the work of those investigators who act in accordance with the old principle "*solvitur ambulando*."

No psychologist who is not blinded by controversy can read "*Primitive Mentality*" without realising that these two standpoints present no fundamental opposition and that in many important investigations both are necessary if we are to obtain a full and fair insight into the facts.

In his preface the author shows the relation of this book to his earlier work: "*Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures*."

"*Mental Functions* laid special stress upon the law of participation, considered in relation to the principle of identity, and also upon the fact that the primitive has but slight perception of the law of contradiction. The object of '*Primitive Mentality*' rather is to show what causation means to primitives and the inferences derived from their idea of it." Right through the work, whether he be dealing with dreams or omens, divination or ideals, the author keeps closely to this point. So long as we view merely the behaviour of primitive people we are ever ready, indeed compelled, to weave in our own mentality, especially our fully-developed concept of mechanical causation. The psychologist, however, must endeavour to view the facts and situations as the primitive man perceives and feels them. The more thoroughly we do this the more we shall find, according to the author of this work, that the primitive lives in a very different world from ours, has a very different mentality and hence relates himself to his environment in ways other than those which we follow. Particularly important is the fact that the world of primitive man is shot through and through with mystic forces, and awareness of these and belief in them is not for him a problem of reason but an act of intuition, governed as he is by those "collective representations" that Lévy-Bruhl described in his earlier work. The problem is by no means an easy one, for the data which the author uses have been gathered by those whose minds worked on the causality-principle and the facts are therefore reported in a form that does not conflict with this principle of the observer's mind.

"In all sincerity the earlier observers, whether clergy or laity, nearly always distort and pervert the institutions and beliefs they report from the mere fact that they unhesitatingly express them in terms with which they themselves are familiar."

It is very difficult for the man without philosophical training to realise to what an extent the world of his experience is built up round such fundamental ideas as cause, time, space. Still more difficult is it for him to understand that other people, who lack these ideas, build up their world in a very different manner. "Our idea of time seems to us to be a natural attribute of the human mind. But this is a delusion. Such an idea scarcely exists where primitive mentality is concerned for that sees the direct causal relation between the given phenomenon and the extra-spatial occult power." Lévy-Bruhl holds that what we

consider the lack of foresight of the native races—a characteristic that makes them a problem difficult for our commercial world—is the inevitable outcome of their vague ideas of time.

Differences such as these are to be found in all aspects of the mental life of primitive man when compared with his fellow of western civilisation. One example must suffice. Lévy-Bruhl gives many instances of decisions come to by the Dayaks from the observation of the flight of birds and then adds, "*We visualize the characteristic shape of their bodies, their wings, beaks, movements, on the ground and in flight, and so on; and on these we superimpose the idea of their mystic properties. But to the Dayak's mind these properties, which he considers of incomparable importance, conceal all the others. In the omen-bird he sees first of all the sacred being, the mystic power on which his lot depends.*"

The literature of primitive peoples have been extensively drawn on for illustrations of the principles that the author wishes to make prominent, viz., that the scientific idea of cause plays little if any part in the mental constructions of the primitive, that he lives in a world dominated by mystic forces and that the whole of his relations to these forces are determined by collective representations that in the forms of tradition and ceremony are handed down from one generation to another. The book is thus a mine of apposite quotations from the works of the great investigators of primitive peoples that throw light on the mentality of this stage of development. Dreams, omens, divination, ordeals and primitive man's reaction to the ideas and remedies of civilisation, are all treated in this way and the work is, therefore, a very valuable guide to those Australasians upon whom are beginning to fall great responsibilities in the control of the primitive peoples in the mandated territories. A study of this book would equip them in some measure for their work and help to prevent such errors and catastrophes as have happened in the past.

At least some readers will ask themselves whether this great gulf can be fixed between the primitive and the civilised mind. It is true that primitive peoples are not scientific in the modern meaning of that term. But is it not also true that the great majority of so-called civilised people are just as unscientific? To the difficulties of life they react in the accepted or customary way, which is precisely what the primitive man does. In nine cases out of ten civilised man, faced with a new situation, reacts mystically and not scientifically. The mysticism of the 18th century and the growing mysticism of our own day, the aftermath of the emotional stirrings of the war-years, bear witness to the fact. It is true that the primitive mind is orientated by mystical ideas whereas the mind of the scientific thinker is influenced mainly by the principle of causation. It is a mistake, however, to imagine that the former type of mind is peculiar to the peoples of the earth commonly called primitive. The signs of mysticism in western thought and action to-day are obvious enough.

PSYCHOLOGY AND MORALS. By J. A. Hadfield, London. Methuen and Co. 1923. Pp. 186.

This book is another contribution to the large literature of Psychoanalysis. For the psychologist it contains little that is fresh: the writer keeps, of set purpose, to the doctrines of the "new" psychology concerning which there is least divergence of opinion, and expounds them with fair lucidity. (Inter alia, he makes a distinction between recognized and unrecognized or repressed complexes, and differentiates the former from sentiments in that they are unacceptable to the "organized self.") The McDougall view of instinct is prominent, and the influence of Rivers is apparent in the relating of the instincts to repression as well as in the continually recurring notion of conflict. It is for the student of ethics that the book has chief value. The author is a psycho-physician, and his governing point of view is that "in dealing with the psychoneuroses the physician is compelled to face the moral problems which lie at the root of these disorders." Such problems are those of Motives, Conscience, Temptation, Evil, Moral Progress, Asceticism, Sacrifice, and Self-Realization. It is obvious that the psychological prolegomena to ethics will need overhauling in the light of recent research in Psychopathology. Mr. Hadfield essays this task, and his findings are often suggestive. Assuming that the ideal is self-realization, he examines the nature of the self (a) as disorganized through the play of unconscious energy, and (b) as harmonized and fully active through the liberation and re-direction of repressed emotions. There is an interesting chapter on Sublimation, which the author believes to be a second best device in comparison with the direct employment of innate energy: but "even when we use an instinct in the natural way, there is still a large excess of emotion which may be sublimated." The "first best" is therefore a combination of natural use and sublimation.

—A. C. Fox.

THE NUMBER SYSTEM OF ARITHMETIC AND ALGEBRA. By D. K. Picken. Melbourne University Press. 1923. Pp. 76.

In this book Mr. Picken outlines the development of the Number System from the Natural Numbers to the complete system of Complex Numbers. He is guided by two general aims, one theoretical, the other practical; namely, (1) the establishing of a system of numbers subject without restriction to generalised operations based upon the fundamental operation of addition; (2) the maintenance of the function of number as the expression of the results of measurement. In several respects the book is excellent. The insistence on the fact that, with each extension of the number system, the fundamental operations are generalized by definition, not by deduction, is much needed; the various applications of Dedekind's definition of the irrational number are useful illustrations of its significance, while the method of Decimal Approximation shews how it can be used in practical calculations.

As a contribution to the logical theory of number the book is not wholly satisfactory. The author appears to reject Dedekind's view of

number as a conceptual instrument by which we apprehend more clearly the external world, and speaks of number as "something about which we learn from sources outside ourselves." This standpoint leads him to "expect the existence of" numbers that will make inverse operations such as subtraction, division, evolution and logarithmation always possible. The attempt to extend the system of numbers by means of the fundamental operations introduces logical difficulties: for example, the definition of $5/3$ by means of the equation $5/3 \times 3 = 5$ defines the unknown number $5/3$ by means of an unknown operation, the addition of three fractions. For a satisfactory resolution of these difficulties we are forced back on the idea of order and the main weakness of Mr. Picken's book arises from the fact that it ignores this fundamental idea. The appendix on the multiplication sign opens up a debatable question. Mr. Picken makes out a good case against the usual convention, but it is doubtful whether it is strong enough to destroy a practice so long established. The appendix on nought and infinity is somewhat dangerous. In spite of the note on p. 69 it is liable to confirm the inexperienced reader in the common error of treating ∞ as a definite number. The ideas of the section are better expressed in terms of the notation of the theory of limits.

—H. J. Priestley.

THE DOMINANT SEX. A Study in the Sociology of Sex Differentiation. By Mathilde and Mathias Vaerting, translated by E. and C. Paul. Allen & Unwin. 1923. Pp. 240.

In this interesting book two main positions are stated and restated with many and varied illustrations. These are: (1) That many features of our civilisation are to be attributed to "monosexual dominance" though they are not usually so attributed, and (2) That such "monosexual dominance" is not a fixed nor a necessary phenomenon. In individuals, masculine qualities are not qualities inherent in men, but qualities of a dominant sex; feminine qualities are those of a dominated sex. And these qualities need not be distributed as they are at present. The characteristics of men and women both mental and physical, of social institutions, art, religion and government, as we find them in modern states, depend not on inherent differences between the sexes even when they appear to do so, but on the fact that at present "monosexual dominance" prevails in all civilised communities, and that that dominance is a dominance of men. We are bidden to free our minds from prejudice and view the world we live in, in the logic of a long and wide view of history. The male was not always the dominant sex. Women predominated in ancient Egypt and Sparta and in various more primitive communities both ancient and modern. Also, we may study the institutions of both ancient and modern people where the movement from the dominance of one sex to the domination of the other was or is temporarily in a phase approximating to equality of rights between the sexes. Under feminine dominance we find a reversal of modern civilised customs in courtship, divorce, the double sexual

standard, the respective ages of men and women in marriage; a wide difference in the ethics of illegitimacy, abortion and prostitution; a reversal even of some physical characteristics as well as of psychological qualities and capacities.

The point of view taken by the writers offers a good mental discipline in its freedom from the predisposition of current ideas, although some suspicion may be felt as to the evidence on which so complete a case is founded. Whether that evidence is sufficient and not overstrained could only be settled by a thorough examination of the sources so freely referred to by the authors. No mention is made in the book of recent biological research which seems to point to certain not obvious inherent sex differences at least physically and possibly psychically also. Neither do the authors quote psychological research by means of intelligence tests, the results of which strengthen their contention of the intellectual equality of the sexes. But if, as they maintain, the problem of dominance is a sociological one, it can be solved neither by biology nor by psychology, and their appeal to anthropology is the right one.

Some of the difficulties of the historical research in the opinion of the authors are indicated in the chapter entitled "The Campaign Against the Historical Vestiges of the Dominance of Women" where is discussed the tendency of members of the ruling sex to destroy or distort reminders of the fact that in former days their sex was subordinate. In the historic period records have been made by men, and according to our authors rationalisation on a huge scale has taken place in the accounts of people and periods where women ruled. The point of view of both men and women of to-day is colored by the fact that we live in a "men's state."

But this modern "men's state" is not static. It is in transition to a state of "equality of sexual rights." There is a continual swing of the pendulum by which masculine dominance is replaced by feminine, and feminine by masculine, with intervening periods of approximate sex equality. We are now entering such a period which may result finally in feminine dominance. But this result would be as deplorable as masculine dominance. "It is absolutely essential that humanity should discover ways and means for the *permanent* realisation of the ideal of sex equality and for the permanent prevention of either type of monosexual dominance" (p. 225). Power alone makes either sex free, but it must be power that refrains from domination, power free from any taint of the bully.

—M. Muscio.

JOURNALS RECEIVED.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. Edited by Professors Woodbridge and Bush, Columbia University. Published fortnightly at Sub-Station 84, New York City, U.S.A. Yearly subscription, four dollars.

Vol. XX. No. 20. The X and the Y of Psychology: O. O. Norris. Is there Material Substance? W. H. Sheldon. No. 21. A critique of Pragmatic Ethics: A. Weimberg. The X and the Y of Psychology—II.: O. O. Norris. No. 22. Immediate Inference Revised: A. E. Avey. Activity and Objects in Dewey's "Human Nature and Conduct": G. P. Adams. No. 23. Values, Liking and Thought: J. Dewey. Contribution to the theory of Propositions: J. R. Mattingley. No. 24. The Philosophy of Feeling in Current Poetics: K. Gilbert. No. 25. B. Bosanquet as I knew him: J. H. Muirhead. No. 26. The Background of Instrumentalism: W. T. Bush.

SCHOOLING. Edited by A. Mackie and P. R. Cole. Teachers' College Press, Sydney. Vol. VII. No. 2. Dec. 1923.

The Continuation Schools of New York City: P. R. Cole. Technique of the French Lesson: E. G. Waterhouse. The Dalton Plan at Darlington: W. Vout and P. S. Tapp. History Pictures: D. Sinclair. Handwriting: J. W. Benton. Types of Error in Division: H. P. Willcock.

THE TASMANIAN TEACHER. Official Organ of the Tasmanian Teachers' Union. Launceston, 1923.

No. 2. (Vol. V.) contains an address on Mental Hygiene and the School by E. Morris Miller, M.A., Litt.D., Director of State Psychological Clinic and Lecturer on Psychology. 1. Introductory. 2. Mental Hygiene Standpoint: Individualise the Child. 3. Mental and physical health examination on admission to school. 4. Classification of children in the schools. 5. The Teacher, his status, training and attitude.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA, Sydney. Published weekly. Price, 1/-.

No. 22 (Dec. 1, 1923) contains an article on *Psycho-Therapy in Practice*. By Dr. Ralph A. Noble.

The Supplement to No. 6 (Feb. 9, 1924) contains the Transactions of the Australasian Medical Congress, including a Lecture on *The Emotion of Fear in Health and Disease*, by Sir John MacPherson, Professor of Psychiatry, University of Sydney.

NOTES AND NEWS.

The Second General Annual Meeting of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy will be held this year at the University of Melbourne. It will take the form of a short Congress, opening at three o'clock on Thursday afternoon, May 29th, and closing on the following Friday evening, or Saturday morning. It is hoped that members of the Association and affiliated societies, will make a special effort to attend this first Philosophical Congress in the history of Australia, and it is requested that all members from States

outside Victoria or from New Zealand, who propose to be present at the Congress, will notify the Secretary of the Melbourne University Philosophical Society, Mr. George Anderson, 550-551 Lonsdale Street, Melbourne, of their intention to come. A programme of the Congress will be issued later to each member of the Association and Affiliated Societies.

The June number of this Journal will contain the first of a series of articles on *Problems of Spiritual Experience*, by Professor Boyce Gibson of Melbourne University. The articles were read as papers of a Tutorial Course at the Summer Conference of the A.S.C.M. at Adelaide, January, 1924. I. The Knowledge of God. II. The Personal Bond. III. Love, The Ideal and The One. IV. Freedom and Evil.

The June number will also contain the Prize Essay on *The Relation of Repression to Mental Development*, by K. S. Cunningham, M.A., University of Melbourne. The Prize Essay on *The Pragmatic Theory of Truth*, by R. Anschutz, B.A., Auckland University College, will appear in the September number of the Journal.

The Sydney Local Branch of the Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy will hold five meetings during 1924. The first meeting in Lent Term will take the form of a Symposium upon *The Meaning of Value*, from the standpoint (a) of Psychology (Professor Lovell); (b) Economics (Professor Mills); (c) Philosophy (Professor Muscio). At the following meeting Mr. G. V. Portus, Director of Tutorial Classes, will read a paper on *Some Recent Views of the State*. In addition to the five regular meetings, it is expected that Professor John Adams, who will be visiting Sydney under the auspices of The University Extension Board, will address the members of the Sydney Local Branch. Although only members of the Parent Association may become members of the Local Branch, undergraduates of Sydney University may be admitted to Associate Membership of the Local Branch, on payment of the Branch subscription (1/-).

Mr. W. M. Kyle, M.A., has been appointed Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Queensland. Mr. Kyle is a graduate of the local University, and has had considerable experience as teacher and lecturer.

Miss Ruth Thomas, B.A., has been appointed Lecturer on Psychology at the Teachers' Training College, Perth, Western Australia. Miss Thomas is a distinguished graduate of Sydney University. She has recently been acting as Junior Lecturer on Psychology at the Sydney Teachers' College. She was *proxime accessit* for the Prize Essay on *The Relation of Repression to Mental Development*.

The Annual Report of the Dean of the Graduate Faculties of Columbia University, U.S.A. (1923) mentions as one of the noteworthy events of the year, the enlargement of the "offerings" of the Department of Philosophy to include the History and Philosophy of Religion, and adds, "Provision should be made as soon as possible in the Department of Philosophy for a Professorship of Comparative Religion."

The following quotations should have a significance for Australians. "I am quite satisfied that the craze for the High School has become

a fetish. I am more concerned with the needs of primary education." Mr. Bruntnell, N.S.W. Minister of Education, in answer to the request for the establishment of a High School at Murwillumbah, the centre of a prosperous and populous North Coast district. From the *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 8th, 1924.

"I believe that more money is voted for educational purposes in Japan in proportion to population, than in any other country in the world. This is not all: in Japan the men who have the responsibility of teaching the young and producing the citizens of the future, are paid as they ought to be. The number of young men who are sent abroad to complete their education is surprising. So it comes about that the man of affairs in Japan to-day, *the men who have to fill the most important posts*, the men of science, the doctors and lawyers, are among the best educated men in the world." W. Farmer Whyte (formerly Editor) *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, Feb. 9th, 1923.

The Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy

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Vice-Presidents: Professor W. Anderson, M.A.; Professor M. Scott Fletcher, M.A., B.Litt.; Professor T. A. Hunter, M.A., M.Sc.; Professor H. Tasman Lovell, M.A., Ph.D.; Professor B. Muscio, M.A.; Professor J. McKellar Stewart, M.A., D.Phil.

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CORRIGENDA.

Article, THE MEANING OF PHILOSOPHY. (II.) By Professor W. Anderson. (A.J. of P. and P. Vol I. No. 4).

Page 244, line 18 from bottom of page, for "physical causation" read "psychical causation."

Page 246, line 3 from top of page, for tendencies to "rationalise," read tendencies to "rationalisation."

Article, NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL THINKING.

Misplaced line, Page 268. Line 10 from bottom (the worse off . . . writings) should appear on page 272 as line 8 from bottom.

Index. p. VI. For Yung, read Jung.